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Although the United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol,'
a multitude of alternative domestic approaches to combat climate
change have emerged at all levels of government. On March 31, 2007,
the University of San Francisco Law Review sponsored a symposium to
showcase and evaluate the most significant efforts, entitled "The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives" ("the conference" or "the symposium").
The conference took place amid a whirlwind of public attention
to the threat of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fourth Assessment Report, issued in February 2007,
presented a sobering scientific consensus on the current reality of
global warming and on the inevitability of highly destructive impacts
to come. 2 The ascension of Democratic majorities in both houses of
Congress in January 2007 led to daily hearings on Capitol Hill, 3 focus1. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:
The Case of Climate Change,32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 186 (2005). The United States is, however,
a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC"),
May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2. See RICHARD ALLEY ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf. The document provided Working Group I's
contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, a report prepared every five years.
3. As one reporter has noted, "Congress is so keenly interested in the topic [of climate change] that there were three separate climate change hearings Tuesday [February
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ing a lens on the risks ahead and opportunities to address them. With
an underlying sense of urgency, the conference provided a forum for
evaluating a broad array of paths for domestic action.
This Article takes as given that climate change is a serious environmental problem that requires a legal response-a response that is
likely to change the way we live. Building on the conference presentations, 4 I will evaluate the most significant existing federal and state
measures. This Article not only highlights the key features of federal,
state, and litigation initiatives; it also addresses their respective roles.
In responding to climate change, the nation must confront profound
institutional questions about the relationship between federal and
state regulation, as well as the relationship between democratic
processes and the courts.
The first two Parts of this Article address the nature and sufficiency of existing approaches. Part I evaluates the existing federal approach, consisting primarily of voluntary initiatives. Although
important, I will argue that these initiatives are insufficient to mitigate
the looming consequences of climate change.
Part II explores existing state initiatives that were discussed at the
conference: California's controls on motor vehicle emissions, its
landmark Global Warming Solutions Act, and the Northeastern states'
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"). In assessing the role of
these state initiatives, I consider the broader federalism issues they
raise. I conclude that state initiatives are critically important in the
absence of more robust federal efforts. They will not, however, suffice.
Federal action is necessary. Part III addresses recent congressional proposals. While a full assessment of these proposals is beyond
the scope of this Article, I will identify many of the key issues that
federal legislation must confront. I will also address the thorny institutional question looming on the horizon: Should the emerging federal
laws, if and when enacted, preempt state initiatives? While selective
preemption may be necessary, I argue that new federal legislation
should foster, not dampen, the states' unique contributions.
The remainder of the Article addresses litigation brought by the
states and environmental advocates, a tactic prompted by the absence
of a comprehensive federal program for controlling greenhouse
13, 2007] on Capitol Hill." Zachary Coile, Industry CEOs Testify for Emisszons Lzmits, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 14, 2007, at A5.
4. While I note the insightful contributions made by the conference speakers, this
Article generally presents my independent description and assessment of the covered
topics.
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gases. Part IV focuses on the litigation asking the courts to interpret
existing environmental laws to address climate change. Part V turns to
the common law nuisance actions that the states and environmental
advocates have brought against electric utilities and the automobile
companies. In evaluating the common law nuisance actions, I will return to profound institutional questions: I suggest that the courts remain a vital forum for addressing climate change, particularly in the
absence of comprehensive action by the other branches of
government.
I.

Existing Federal Initiatives

The Bush administration has focused on encouraging voluntary
measures and scientific research rather than adopting emission-reduction targets and regulatory limitations. At the conference, Amy
Zimpfer, the point person on energy and climate change for Region 9
of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), described EPA's
and other federal agencies' climate change initiatives. 5 Rather than
setting a specific target for greenhouse gas emissions, the Bush administration seeks to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the United
States economy by 18 percent through the year 2012.6 "Greenhouse
gas intensity" refers to the amount of greenhouse gases produced per
unit of economic output. 7 It measures, in essence, the economy's energy efficiency, since a decrease in greenhouse gas intensity means
that less energy is being used to produce a given level of economic
gain. The net emissions impact of the administration's goal is difficult
to gauge, with significantly different estimates provided by different
agencies.8
5. The administration's initiatives could be seen as an effort to implement the
United States' obligations under UNFCCC, which states that developed countries should
aim to achieve 1990 levels of emissions by the year 2000. UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 4,
para. 2(a)-(b).

6.
CHANGE:

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE,

USA

PARTNERSHIPS IN AcrION

ENERGY

NEEDS,

CLEAN

DEVELOPMENT AND

CLIMATE

4 (2006), available at http://ww.state.gov/g/oes/

climate. The goal is to achieve an average reduction of 18 percent between 2002, when the
policy was adopted, and 2012. See EPA, U.S. Climate Policy and Actions, http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/policy/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) [hereinafter EPA, U.S. Climate Policy and Actions].
7. See EPA, U.S. Climate Policy and Actions, supra note 6.
8. In March 2007, EPA's website stated that the greenhouse gas intensity goal would
lead to a cumulative reduction of more than 500 million metric tons of greenhouse gases
between 2002 and 2012. Id. A 2006 State Department publication stated, in contrast, that
"[t]he Administration estimates that its [greenhouse gas intensity] goal will reduce ctImulative emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent by more than 1,833 million metric tons by
2012 ....
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 4. It is not clear why the State Department
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To achieve the greenhouse gas intensity goal, the administration
has implemented a number of voluntary reduction programs with
trade associations and individual companies. Under the Climate VISION program, EPA and the Departments of Energy, Transportation,
and Agriculture are working with fourteen energy-intensive sectors,
sectors which account for approximately 40 to 50 percent of domestic
emissions, to set voluntary emissions reduction targets for each industrial or agricultural sector.9 EPA's Climate Leaders program works
with individual companies to help them inventory emissions and set
greenhouse gas reduction or efficiency goals.' 0 The administration
has also initiated a voluntary registry for greenhouse gas emissions to
help companies document their reduction efforts." Numerous other
programs encourage energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, and seek to reduce transportation and agriculture-related
emissions. 12
In addition to voluntary emissions reduction initiatives, the Bush
administration's climate change policy promotes science and technology research.' 3 On the international front, the administration has enis estimating reductions that are more than three times the levels estimated by EPA. Differing predictions about economic growth could explain differing outcomes, but the difference appears too large to be explained by that factor alone.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 4. For more information, see the Climate
VISION website at http://www.climatevision.gov.
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 4-5. For more information, refer to
http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders. For an assessment of the implementation of the Climate VISION and Climate Leaders programs, see U.S. GoVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIIMATE CHANGE:

EPA

AND

DOE

SHOULD

Do

MORE TO ENCOURAGE

PROGRESS UNDER

Two

VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0697.pdf.
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 8.

12. For example, the ENERGY STAR program, run by EPA and the Department of
Energy ("DOE"), certifies energy efficient products so that consumers can make informed
choices. Id. at 5. The Renewable Energy Systems and Energy Efficiency Improvements Program is designed to spur the market in renewable energy by helping agricultural producers
and rural businesses increase energy efficiency and purchase renewable energy. Id. at 6. In
the transportation sector, the administration has initiated the SmartWay Transport Partnership to encourage truck, rail, and shipping companies to reduce emissions of both
greenhouse gases and other pollutants, id. at 5, and has required increased fuel economy
for light trucks. Id. at 7. The Department of Agriculture is working through its conservation and environmental quality programs to provide incentives for agricultural practices
that reduce emissions and help sequester carbon. Id. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a number of tax incentives to invest in alternative energy. Id. EPA has several assistance programs to help reduce emissions of methane, a potent greenhouse gas. Id. at 10;
see generally id. at 5-10 (describing numerous federal programs).
13. The Climate Change Science Program is designed to oversee grants for research
into climate change science and technology that are sponsored by thirteen different federal agencies and departments. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 12. The Climate
Change Technology Program coordinates ten federal agencies' investments in climate-re-
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gaged in bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote more
environmentally-sound development. Many of these programs involve
multiple countries and are organized as public-private partnerships,
14
with extensive involvement by aid agencies and relevant industries.
One significant regional effort is the Asia-Pacific Partnership for
Clean Development and Climate ("APP"), a partnership involving the
United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The partnership is noteworthy because it includes the two developed countries that have not signed the Kyoto Protocol (the United
States and Australia) ,15 as well as China and India, two large-population developing countries who, as developing countries, are not subject to emission reduction requirements. 1 6 The participating countries
include half the world's population 1 7 and, according to the State Department, include "about half of the world's economic output, energy
use, and greenhouse gas emissions."' 8
Do these federal initiatives provide a sufficient response to the
threats posed by climate change? The initiatives have prompted many
companies to monitor and commit to reducing their carbon emissions
(or emissions intensity). 19 But the federal government's greenhouse
lated technology. The $3 billion in annual investments will go to alternative energy (solar,
biomass/biofuels, hydrogen fuels, nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion), reduced emissions
from coal incineration, carbon sequestration, and energy efficiency. See id. at 13-16.
14. Key programs to assist the developing world in developing in a more sustainable
manner include (1) the Clean Energy Initiative, designed to increase access to energy,
improve indoor air quality, decrease vehicular pollution, and increase energy efficiency;
(2) the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, to increase the marketability
of renewable energy and energy efficiency; and (3) the Renewable Energy Policy Network
for the 21st Century, designed to build institutional capacity for implementing energy alternatives. See id. at 18-20.
15. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol:
Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/background/statusof"
ratification/application/pdf/kp-ratifcation.pdf (last modified June 6, 2007) (indicating
which countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol).
16. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3, para. 7, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (establishing emission limitations for
Annex I countries, which do not include the developing countries). In 2007, China became the world's largest emitter, surpassing the United States. See Stephanie Ohshita, The
Scientific and InternationalContext for Domestic Climate Change, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 32 (2007).
While still far below the United States on a per capita basis, see zd. at 33 fig. 4, China's
emissions are highly significant on a global scale. India's emissions remain low per capita
in relation to those in the United States, but its gross emissions are increasing. See id. at 31
(describing India's 61 percent growth rate in emissions).
17. See id. at 28.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 22.
19. See, e.g., EPA, Climate Leaders - Partners, http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/
partners/index.html (listing 139 participating companies) (last visited July 16, 2007).
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gas intensity goal, and the voluntary initiatives designed to achieve it,
are unlikely to control greenhouse gases at the rate necessary to avoid
the increasing risks posed by climate change. The Pew Center on Climate Change has argued that, even if the United States reaches the 18
percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity goal, economic growth
will cause net emissions to increase to 30 percent above 1990 levels by
2012,20 far above the 7 percent below 1990 levels that the Kyoto Protocol would have required by that date. 2 1 Recent data support the Pew
Center's predictions: although greenhouse gas intensity has been improving, emissions are nonetheless increasing. 22 United States emissions have been increasing at about 1 percent per year since 1990,23
and are already 17 percent higher than in 1990.24 Scientists have ar-

gued that greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced to 60-80 percent below current levels in order to stabilize the climate and avoid
25
potentially catastrophic climate changes.
Voluntary measures also fail to incentivize needed technological
developments. When reductions are mandatory, technology developers can be assured of a market for their products and are more likely
26
to invest in research and development.
While the administration's encouragement of voluntary measures
and investments has begun the process, more stringent binding legal
requirements appear necessary. To date, the states have been the primary source of most regulatory requirements.
20. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Analysis of President Bush's Climate Change
Plan, http://www.pewclimate.org/policy-center/analyses/response-bushpolicy.cfm
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2007), reprintedin DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 703 (3d ed. 2007). The Pew Center also argues
that the greenhouse gas intensity goal is not likely to spur reductions that go beyond those
that would be likely to be achieved by existing legal and market pressures. Since greenhouse gas intensity fell by 21 percent in the 1980s and by 16 percent in the 1990s, id., an 18
percent reduction goal would not achieve any additional reductions.
21. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16, at annex B.
22. From 2004 to 2005, the economy grew by 3.2 percent while greenhouse gas intensity decreased by 2.5 percent. Mike Ferullo, Government Report Shows Slight Increase in Greenhouse Gas Emissions for 2005, 37 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2344 (2006). Nonetheless, overall
emissions increased during this time period by 0.6 percent. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Ohshita, supra note 16, at 12. That reduction is intended to stabilize carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere at 450 ppm. Id.
26. See Zachary Coile, Greenland Ice Melt Speeds Up; Emissions Controls: Pelosi to Push for
California-Style Cap-and-TradeSystem to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 2007, at
A3 [hereinafter Coile, Greenland Ice Melt] (describing Representative Markey's statement
that industries prefer mandatory restrictions and will invest in new technologies if required
to do so).
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Existing State Initiatives

The states have responded to the absence of direct federal regula-7
2
tion of greenhouse gas emissions with a surprisingly vital response.
An exploration of select state programs will also demonstrate why
many of these efforts are worth preserving, with or without subsequent
federal regulation.
Professor John Dernbach of Widener University School of Law,
the moderator of the conference's panel on state initiatives, noted at
the outset that somewhere between fifteen and twenty governors say
their states are "leading" on climate change. He noted that states are
using a variety of tools-notjust greenhouse gas reduction targets-to
address the issue.2 8 Many have adopted renewable portfolio standards,2 " efficiency requirements, 0 and state and regional emissions
registry programs."' USF's conference focused on several of the most
far-reaching state initiatives taken to date: California's restrictions on
motor vehicle emissions, 32 California's Global Warming Solutions
Act, 33 and the Northeastern states Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 34 It is, however, important to acknowledge that, prior to these
efforts, various regional, 35 state, 36 and local 3 7 actions to address cli27. See David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to
Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 53, 55 (2003) (noting that "states
have become frustrated with the failure of the Bush Administration to develop national
and international global warming mitigation policies").
28. EPA and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change both provide comprehensive
lists of state actions on their websites. See EPA, State and Regional Climate Action Table,
(last vishttp://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/stateandlocalgov/state_actionslist.html
ited Sept. 29, 2007); Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, What's Being Done . .. In the
States, http://wwv.pewclimate.org/what-s-being_done/in the states (last visited Sept. 9,
2007).
29. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Romkn & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source
Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. EN;rL. L.J. 1, 29 (2005) (noting that twentyone states and the District of Columbia have now adopted renewable portfolio standards
that require a certain percentage of renewable energy).
30. For a visual display of state energy efficiency programs, refer to resources found at
Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, State Action Maps, http://wwv.pewclimate.org/what_
s.beingdone/in the-states/state-action.maps.cfm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (including
state action maps for states with energy efficiency resource standards and, Under the Building Sector heading, several other types of energy efficiency standards).
31. SeeJ.R. DeShazo &Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1527-30 (2007) (describing numerous state registry programs).
32. CAL. HEALTh & SAFE' CODE § 43018.5 (West 2006).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETN CODE §§ 38500-99 (West Supp. 2007).
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. In 2001, the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian
Premiers adopted a Climate Action Plan in which the governors and premiers of the partic-
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mate change had already been undertaken, and that additional re38
gional, state, and local initiatives are underway.

ipating states agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, to 10
percent below 1990 levels by 2020, and, ultimately, to reduce emissions to the level necessary to avoid harmful impacts to the environment, assumed at the time to be 75 to 85
percent below 2001 levels. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the
United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENcvrL. L.J. 54, 65 (2005). This regional initiative prompted many of the Northeastern state legislative efforts discussed infta note 36, as
well as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, discussed more extensively in the text. See
infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text. In 2003, California, Washington, and Oregon
launched the West Coast Governors' Global Warming Initiative, in which they agreed to
several recommendations for renewable fuels and energy efficiency. See Engel, supra, at
66-67. Since 2003, the Initiative has established additional cooperative measures. See infra
note 87 and accompanying text (describing Western Regional Climate Action Initiative
among California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, and New Mexico.) A group of officials
from the upper Midwestern states and one Canadian province are cooperating on energy
and agricultural initiatives through a "Powering the Plains" initiative. See Engel, supra, at
67.
36. The state of Maine enacted the first direct climate change legislation in May 2003.
See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not: Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. PoL'v 369, 377
(2006). The legislation implements the objectives of the regional Climate Action Plan,
discussed supra note 35. Abate, supra, at 378. Through administrative regulations, Massachusetts in 2001 had required power plants to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide,
purchase energy from renewable sources, and require new power plants to offset carbon
dioxide emissions. Id. at 378. In 2004, Connecticut also passed legislation to implement the
regional climate action plan. Id. at 379. NewJersey developed a "Sustainability Greenhouse
Action Plan" in 1998. See id. at 381 & n.96. The NewJersey plan calls for a reduction to 3.5
percent below 1990 levels by 2005 and includes numerous initiatives to monitor and reduce emissions. Id. at 381. Oregon and Washington have adopted carbon dioxide emissions limits for new power plants that can be met directly or through purchasing offsets. See
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1523-24. More than half the states have developed
climate change action plans that are not legally enforceable but nonetheless reveal statelevel initiative. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivating
State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say about Federalism
and EnvironmentalLaw?, 38 UB. LAw. 1015, 1018-19 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives].
37. Many cities have enacted specific programs to reduce greenhouse gases. See Abate,
supra note 36, at 384. As of 2006, 132 mayors had promised to meet the Kyoto Protocol's
target for the United States: a reduction of 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. Id. at 385.
The 2003 Mayors'Statement on Global Warmingwas signed by 155 mayors who agreed to pass
formal resolutions committing their cities to address climate change. Id. at 384-85.
38. A headline in the San Francisco Chronicle on April 2, 2007 read: "Legislature
flooded with bills about climate crisis." Mark Martin, Legislature Hooded With Bills About Climate
Crisis - Poll-driven PoliticiansSee Need to Tackle Global Warming, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2007, at
Al. The article noted that California legislators introduced sixty bills on climate change
this term. Id. New Jersey has also recently enacted comprehensive climate change legislation, requiring reductions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 80 percent below 2006 levels by
2050. See Anthony DePalma, High Goals for Reducing Emissions in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2007, at B5.
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In July 2002, the California legislature required automakers to reduce vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases from cars and light-duty
trucks sold in California. 39 The law, known as "AB 1493" or the "Pavley
Bill" (after its primary sponsor), represents a bold effort to change
business as usual. Automobiles represent 20 percent of the nation's
greenhouse gas emissions 40 and over 30 percent of emissions in California. 4 1 The federal government has not set tailpipe emissions standards for carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas emissions. EPA
stated in 2003 that it did not have the authority to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from automobiles, 42 a position it maintained until
the Supreme Court held that EPA did have such authority in Massachusetts v. EPA, 4 3 decided April 2, 2007 (two days after the symposium). The nation's fuel efficiency standards, which might indirectly
limit greenhouse gas emissions, have not changed in response to increasing evidence of climate change. 44 California's legislation was
thus the first (and only) regulatory effort in the nation to address the
automobile sector's greenhouse gas emissions.
The Pavley Bill could influence automobile emission standards
not only in California, but in a number of other states as well. Although the Clean Air Act generally preempts state vehicle emission
standards, California is allowed to develop its own standards, so long
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (West 2006).
40. Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 9, para. 40, California ex rel
Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006).
41. Id. Automobile emissions are likely a larger component of California's emissions
than they are in other states due to California's high automobile use, its relatively lowcarbon electricity sector (with more nuclear and renewable sources, and fewer coal-based
sources, than other states), and its high level of energy efficiency. See Ann Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 281, 291 (2003).
42. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1450-51 (2007) (describing EPA's denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, based on EPA's
assertion that it did not have the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions).
43. Id. at 1459-62.
44. Fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles have been the same since 1986.
Carlson, supra note 41, at 289-90. Since the conference, the Senate has passed legislation
raising fuel efficiency standards, but action in the House is unlikely. See Zachary Coile, Boost
in Fuel Economy for Cars and Trucks OKd in Senate, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Coile, Boost in Fuel Economy]. A number of states and public interest environmental
groups have sued the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration alleging that the fuel
efficiency standards fail to address the environmental consequences of climate change. See
Marc Lifsher, StateJoins in Suit Against U.S. Over Rules on Mileage, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2007,
at CIO.
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as EPA waives the otherwise applicable preemption provision. 45
Other states have the option of adopting either the national standards
or the California standards, and eleven states have chosen to adopt
the California standards. 46 Therefore, California's vehicle emission
standards could affect vehicle emissions well beyond the state's
47
borders.
At the conference, Ellen Peter of the California Attorney General's Office explained the Pavley Bill and its implementing regulations. The Pavley Bill requires the California Air Resources Board
("CARB") to develop "regulations that achieve the maximum feasible
and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles." 48 The regulations, promulgated in 2004, seek to reduce automobiles' greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below 2002 levels
when fully implemented by 2016.49 The regulations establish fleet average requirements for greenhouse gas emissions for two separate categories: (1) passenger cars and small trucks/SUVs, and (2) large
trucks/SUVs. 50 The regulations suggest, but do not require, several
technologies and mechanisms that automakers could employ to reach
the fleet-wide emission reduction requirements. 5 1 Based on the technologies it expects the automobile industry to adopt, the CARB
52
predicts that the regulations will slightly increase automobile costs.

However, assuming a fuel price of $1.74, the CARB predicts that the
45. Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") generally preempts state regulation
of auto emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). However, EPA has the authority to waive
preemption for state standards in existence when the CAA was passed. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
Since California was the only state with auto emission standards at the time the CAA was
adopted, the law effectively allowed California, but only California, to set its own standards.
See Carlson, supra note 41, at 293.
46. See Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Frequently Asked Questions: Climate
Change Emission Reduction Standards for Vehicles, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/
ccfaq.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) (stating that eleven states have adopted California's
standard and six more are considering doing so).
47. One commentator suggests that "[t]he combined number of vehicles in these
states amounts to roughly 'a third of the national passenger vehicle market.'" Michael H.
Wall, Comment, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and CaliforniaAssembly Bill 1493: Filling the American Greenhouse Gas Regulation Void, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 567, 578 (2007) (quoting a post to the Union of Concerned Scientists website).
48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2006).
49. See Wall, supra note 47, at 577. The regulations were intended to take effect in
January 2006, and set near-term standards for 2009-12 and mid-term standards for
2013-16. Id.; see also Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Fact Sheet on Climate Change
Emission Control Regulations, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ccnewfs.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Air Res. Bd., Fact Sheet] (describing regulations).
50. Air Res. Bd., Fact Sheet, supra note 49, at 2.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
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standards will provide consumers with a net savings over the vehicles'
53
lives.
2.

Legal Obstacles to Implementation

The future of California's legislation is highly uncertain. The
CARB's regulations cannot take effect unless EPA waives the Clean Air
Act's preemption provision. 5 4 EPA is required to grant the waiver if
the state standards are as protective as federal standards 55 and meet
additional criteria, including a showing that they are necessary "to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." 56 EPA has virtually
always granted California's waiver requests, but the fact that California
is attempting to regulate greenhouse gases rather than criteria pollutants creates new uncertainties, the discussion of which are beyond
57
the scope of this Article.
Moreover, in 2004, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Witherspoon,58 numerous auto interests challenged the CARB's regulations.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., of Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, explained
the auto industries' perspective at the conference. 59 Mr. Boutrous
stated that, as a Californian, he is proud of the State's leadership in
addressing climate change, but that many of the State's efforts are
53. Id. at 3. Since gas prices have increased to over $3 per gallon since the analysis was
conducted, the financial impact of the regulation is likely to be even less than predicted.
54. The state applied for a waiver of federal preemption on December 21, 2005. See
David Dickinson, EPA Sets June 15 Deadline for Comments on Whether to Approve California
Waiver, 38 EN-V'T RP. (BNA) 1010 (2007), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/ENR.
NSF/eh/a0b4k6n2b7. In May 2007, after the Supreme Court decided in Massachusetts v.
EPA that EPA has authority over greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, EPA initiated
the public comment period for the waiver request. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2) (2000); see Carlson, supra note 41, at 295.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C).
57. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 296-98 (discussing waiver); Wall, supra note 47, at
577-82 (discussing waiver). For California's argument that it is entitled to a waiver, see Air
Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Request for a Clean Air Act § 209(b) Waiver of Preemption for California's Adopted and Amended New Motor Vehicles Regulations and Incorporated Test Procedures to Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Support Document (Dec. 21,
2005), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/att2-support.pdf.
58. 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165-66 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Automobile interests also challenged vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards in Vernont and Rhode Island, states
that have adopted the California standards. SeeJusTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE
COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AND COMMON LEGAL ISSUES 15 (2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWL_
Report.pdf.
59. Although Mr. Boutrous was not directly involved in the litigation, his firm is involved in and he is familiar with the case. He also represents automobile interests in California's common law nuisance case against the major United States automakers, a case
discussed infra in Part V.A.
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preempted. The plaintiffs' primary allegations are that California's
auto emission standards are preempted by the Clean Air Act, by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA"), the statute authorizing
federal fuel efficiency standards, and by the general foreign affairs
60
powers of the federal government.
In Witherspoon, the district court held that the Clean Air Act preemption issue turns on whether or not EPA grants the preemption
waiver: if EPA does not grant a waiver from preemption, then California's efforts are preempted; if EPA does grant a waiver, then California's efforts are consistent with the dual regulatory scheme that
Congress contemplated. 6' The court has enjoined California from enforcing the regulations unless and until EPA grants the state a
62
waiver.
With regard to the EPCA claim, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration ("NHTSA") is charged with implementing
EPCA by establishing national fuel-efficiency standards based on a
wide variety of factors. 6 3 Since increasing fuel efficiency is one of the
most important mechanisms for achieving reductions in greenhouse
gases, the plaintiffs argue that California's emission reduction regulations are, at heart, regulating fuel efficiency, and are therefore pre64
empted by EPCA.
The Witherspoon court stayed proceedings on this issue to await
the Supreme Court's ruling on a similar argument presented in Massachusetts v. EPA,6 5 a ruling that is now likely to impact the Witherspoon
court's ultimate decision. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court observed
that EPCA's focus on energy efficiency is distinct from EPA's focus on
"protecting the public's 'health' and 'welfare,"' and that these goals
60. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
61. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. 04-6663, slip op. at 6, 2007 WiL
135688 (E.D. Cal.,Jan. 16, 2007).
62. Id. at 12. The court also indicated that the injunction could be lifted if Congress
passed legislation explicitly allowing California to implement its vehicle emission standards. Id.
63. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000).
64. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1167. Plaintiffs claim California's standards are
explicitly preempted by EPCA's prohibition of state standards "related to fuel economy
standards." They claim that they are implicitly preempted because "the California regulations stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of EPCA," which was
designed to consider a multiplicity of environmental, economic, and safety factors, not just
environmental factors. Id. at 1168.
65. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. 04-6663, slip op. at 12, 2007 WI.
135688. The court noted that the Supreme Court's resolution of these issues "will greatly
simplify the resolution of the issues now before the court in this case." Id. at 13.
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are not inherently inconsistent.66 The Court stated that the fact "that

DOT [Department of Transportation] sets mileage standards in no
way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. '67 If the
Witherspoon case follows Massachusetts v. EPA, it is likely to hold that
EPCA's fuel efficiency standards do not preempt California's environmentally-based emission standards.
The automobile company plaintiffs also argue that California's
efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions are preempted by the
President's foreign affairs power because they would interfere with the
President's ability to negotiate a global treaty addressing climate
change.68 Although the cases are not completely analogous, 69 the Su-

preme Court's resolution of Massachusetts v. EPA is likely to influence
the Witherspoon court's resolution of this issue as well. In Massachusetts
v. EPA, the Supreme Court rejected EPA's argument "that regulating
greenhouse gases might impair the President's ability to negotiate
with 'key developing nations' to reduce emissions ....",70 The Court
stated that "while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs,
that authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic
laws.

'7 1

The Court's comments suggest that the President's foreign

affairs power does not give the President exclusive control over regulating greenhouse gases, and that California's effort to regulate greenhouse gases is similarly not preempted by the President's foreign
affairs power.
California's vehicle emissions standards are thus in limbo. EPA
must decide whether to waive the Clean Air Act's preemption provisions, and the Witherspoon court must decide whether the state's effort
is lawful. The results matter. In the absence of federal controls on
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, 72 the California vehicle
emissions limits are a critical tool to prompt the technological innova66. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1461-62 (2007).
67. Id. at 1462.
68. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
69. EPA is required to set air pollutant standards under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521 (2000). California, in contrast, may, but is not required to, set automobile emission
standards.
70. 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
71. Id.
72. The Bush administration has recently announced that it will develop greenhouse
gas standards for automobiles. See Press Release, White House, President Bush Discusses
CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards (May 14, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html. If allowed to move forward, California's standard is
likely to be implemented more quickly, however, and may be more stringent than the
eventual federal standard.
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tions needed to control one of the nation's largest sources of greenhouse gases.
B.

AB 32: California's Global Warming Solutions Act

Beyond vehicle emission standards, California has engaged in further initiatives that demonstrate the importance of state initiatives. At
both the executive and legislative level, the State has set ambitious
statewide greenhouse gas reduction goals. Given the State's size and
influence, California could play a leadership role in the development
of climate change policy in other states and at the national level. Furthermore, California has adopted unique implementation provisions
that are worth preserving even if Congress ultimately adopts federal
legislation.
As Cindy Tuck, the Secretary for Policy at California's umbrella
environmental agency, Cal-EPA, and the conference's keynote
speaker, stated, Governor Schwarzenegger set some of the most ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets in the nation with a 2005 Executive Order. The Executive Order established the goal of reducing
California's greenhouse gas emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, to 1990
levels by 2020, and, even more dramatically, to 80 percent below 1990
levels by 2050. 73 Ms. Tuck observed that the Governor recognized the
need for significant technological breakthroughs to achieve the 2050
goal, and that he expected the State to be at the forefront of the necessary research and development efforts.
More well-known is California's 2006 Global Warming Solutions
Act (the "GWSA" or "AB 32") .4 At the conference,James Goldstene, a
CARB official on the AB 32 implementation team, described the central features of the law. 75

AB

32 adopted one of the interim goals es-

tablished by the Governor's Executive Order: to reduce state
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.76 Although it falls
short of achieving the Kyoto Protocol goal for the United States of a 7
73. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (Cal. 2005), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.
gov/climate-action_team/index.html (follow "Executive Order #S-3-05" hyperlink).
74.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500-99 (West Supp. 2007), available at http://

www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/ab_32_bill-20060927-chaptered.pdf.
75. Mr. Goldstene identified two key challenges in implementing the law: (1) achieving reductions in greenhouse gases that do not lead to concomitant increases in other air
pollutants, and (2) ensuring that, once the regulations take effect in several years, emitters
will get credit for any voluntary emission reductions now. Without that assurance, emitters
might delay making reductions until the regulations are actually imposed.
76.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West Supp. 2007).
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percent reduction below 1990 levels by 2012, 7 7 it is nonetheless expected to achieve a 25 percent reduction below 2006 levels. 78 The
GWSA does not set specific targets following 2020, except to state that
the CARB will "make recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature on how to continue reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
beyond 2020.''7 The California goals are not as ambitious as those

established by several Northeastern states8 0 or the Governor's earlier
Executive Order,8 ' but they far exceed the federal government's
82
goals.
The Gobal Warming Solutions Act provides few directives about
how the state is to achieve its reductions. The statute does not specify
particular sectors to be regulated. It does, however, contemplate direct regulation of at least some sectors or industries: it requires the
CARB to adopt regulations "to achieve the maximum technologically
feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reductions from
sources or categories of sources ....,,83 The law authorizes the CARB
77. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the United States had initially agreed to reduce by 7
percent below 1990 levels over a five-year period from 2008-2012. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
78. See Media Release, California Climate Action Team, State Takes Early Action to
Reduce Greenhouse Gases (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Press
Room/Releases/2007/PR4-031207.pdf. The expected percentage reduction is an estimate.
The state's 1990 emissions level is not currently known with any certainty; the GWSA requires the state to determine the 1990 level of emissions in order to set the 2020 emissions
limit. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550.

79. Id. § 38551(c).
80. In implementing the Comprehensive Regional Climate Change Action Plan agreed to
by New England governors and premiers from eastern Canada, Maine has committed to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 (ten years earlier than California)
and recognized the possibility of future reductions of 75 to 80 percent below 2003 levels.
See Abate, supra note 36, at 377-78. Implementing the same regional climate change action
plan, Massachusetts and Connecticut have set similar goals. Id. at 378-79.
81. As mentioned above, the Governor established the goal of reducing emissions to
80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. As discussed above, the federal government seeks to reduce greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent by 2012, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, a goal that, depending
upon economic growth, might not lead to a net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. See
supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560. The regulations are structured in two
stages. By June 30, 2007, the CARB was required to publish "early action greenhouse gas
emission reduction measures" to be adopted and enforceable by January 1, 2010. Id.
§ 38560.5(a)-(d). The agency adopted three such measures, amid controversy over their
sufficiency. See Mark Martin, Agency's Three New Rules on Warming Criticized, S.F. CHRON.,
June 22, 2007, at BI. ByJanuary 1, 2009, the CARB is required to develop a scoping plan
for how to achieve the 2020 emission reduction goals. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 38561 (a). The scoping plan must consider a wide range of potential avenues, including
"direct emission reduction measures, alternative compliance mechanisms, market-based
compliance mechanisms, and potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives... [as] are
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to consider a wide variety of potential mechanisms, including direct
controls, market measures, and incentive systems.8 4 AB 32 also requires the state to consider a wide range of equitable and policy concerns in designing its regulations.

5

While AB 32 merely states that the CARB "may" adopt a market
mechanism,8 6 California is very likely to adopt a cap and trade program. 87 Under a cap and trade approach, a regulator sets a cap on
emissions and then distributes allowances to existing facilities.,8 Since
the cap is usually lower than existing emissions, the regulated facilities
generally do not receive enough allowances to cover their emissions.
To comply, they can either reduce emissions themselves, or, if doing
so is expensive, they can buy emissions allowances from facilities that
were able to reduce more cheaply.8 9 Cap and trade programs are thus
necessary or desirable to facilitate the achievement of the maximum feasible and costeffective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020." Id. § 38561 (b). By 2011, CARB
is to adopt the relevant measures, to take effect in 2012. Id. § 38562(a).
84. Id. § 38562(b) (describing measures to be considered in developing regulations).
85. The regulations must be "equitable," minimize costs and maximize benefits, and
encourage early reduction efforts, id. § 38562(b) (1), must "not disproportionately impact
low-income communities," id. § 38562(b) (2), must complement and not interfere with efforts to meet the national and state ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants and
to reduce toxics, id. § 38562(b) (4), be cost-effective, id. § 38562(b) (5), "[c]onsider overall
societal benefits, including reductions in other air pollutants, diversification of energy
sources, and other benefits to the economy, environment, and public health . . . ," id.
§ 38562(b) (6), minimize administrative burdens, id. § 38562(b) (7), and minimize leakage,
defined as energy emissions being shifted outside of California rather than eliminated. Id.
§ 38562(b) (8).
86. Id. § 38570(a).
87. In October 2006, two months after signing AB 32 into law, Governor
Schwarzenegger promulgated an Executive Order that stated that state agencies should
"develop a comprehensive market-based compliance program," Exec. Order No. S-20-06,
5 (Cal. 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/executive-order/4484/ ("The
State Air Resources Board shall collaborate with the Secretary for Environmental Protection and the Climate Action Team to develop a comprehensive market-based compliance
program .... "). The Governor also created a Market Advisory Committee. Id. 3. Moreover, in February 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the Western Regional Climate
Action Initiative, which laid the groundwork for a regional cap and trade system among
the signatory states: California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, and New Mexico. Western
Regional Climate Change Initiative (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.
org/ewebeditpro/items/0104F2775.pdf. The Initiative requires the signatory states to set
a regional reduction goal (within six months of the initiative's effective date) and design a
"regional market-based multi-sector mechanism, such as a load-based cap and trade program, to achieve the regional GHG reduction goal .
I..."
Id.; see also Mark Martin, 5 Western
States Announce Effort to Reduce Emissions, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2007, at A7 (describing
initiative).
88. Dennis Hirsch, Andrew Bergman & Michael Heintz, Emissions Trading-Practzcal
Aspects, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 629 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 2007).
89. Id. at 629-30.
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considered economically efficient because they encourage reductions
to be made by those who can do so most cost-effectively.9 0 At the conference, Dominic DiMare, speaking for the California Chamber of
Commerce, noted that, while the Chamber had opposed AB 32,91 the
Chamber believes that implementing the law through a cap and trade
program will allow the law to accomplish its goals with the least economic impact on California businesses.
AB 32 contains few specifics about the technical operation of a
trading system, leaving many critical issues for future resolution. Operational issues, such as whether to distribute allowances for free or by
auction,9 2 whether to allow regulated facilities to account for their
emissions by purchasing offsets from unregulated entities, 9 3 and the
geographic scope of the trading program,9 4 all have important impli90. Id. at 630.
91. He explained that the California Chamber of Commerce had opposed the law
because they feared it would drive business from California, it was too vague and ambiguous, and it did not include important features. They had wanted the bill to include a
"safety valve" that would lower the targets if they were having too great an impact on the
economy. They had also wanted the bill to require, not simply allow, a market-based
system.
92. If allowances were distributed for free, the system would replicate existing permitting processes which do not charge for the "right to pollute." If a facility does not need to
use all of its allowances, however, it could end up selling the excess allowances, which it
received for free, and earn a windfall profit. See infra note 108 and accompanying text
(discussing windfall profits earned by European facilities who sold excess allowances). Auctions also generate government funds that could be used to reimburse consumers for
higher costs, as well as fund energy efficiency initiatives, technology research, and adaptation measures.
93. If the trading program is concentrated in a particular sector, such as electric utilities, then the state will have to determine whether the regulated industries must reduce
emissions among themselves, or whether they can purchase "offsets" from outside the regulated sector. For example, a regulated utility might be able to purchase offsets from an
unregulated farmer who has planted trees that absorb carbon dioxide. The more an entity
can use offsets, the greater the diversity of mechanisms to reduce emissions, the greater the
supply of emissions reduction credits, and the cheaper compliance will be.
94. If participants in a trading program can purchase reductions from a wide geographic area, it might encompass areas in which reductions can be made more cheaply,
reducing the costs of compliance. A wide geographic range could also potentially reduce
costs by increasing the available supply and creating a more competitive market. At the
conference, Dominic DiMare of the California Chamber of Commerce encouraged California to engage in a trading system beyond California's borders, in as wide a geographic
market as possible, so that California businesses can buy emission reduction credits where
reductions are cheapest.
Some environmentalists fear that a broad market will fail to induce the necessary societal changes. A California environmentalist criticized the potential for global trades by
stating that global "[c]ap-and-trade will not get us into a different world; it'll get us planting more eucalyptus trees in Brazil." Matthew Yi, Dents, GovernorSpar Over Road to Clean Air,
S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Yi, Dems, Governor Spar].
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cations for the potential costs of compliance. The lower the costs of
compliance, the less impact on industry and, ultimately, on consumers
and the economy. On the other hand, the higher the costs of compliance, the greater incentive facilities will have to internalize the consequences of their actions by reducing their own emissions and the
greater the financial incentive for developing alternative technologies.
Decisionmakers will have to balance these competing considerations
in designing a cap and trade program.
California's decision to pursue a cap and trade system has been
controversial. 95 A key issue is the inherent tension between cap and
trade systems and environmental justice concerns.9 6 Market-based systems could lead to greater concentrations of greenhouse emissions
where facilities purchase allowances rather than reducing emissions
direcdy. While concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions would not
themselves be harmful, they are almost always emitted with other,
more locally hazardous, pollutants. The higher the permissible green97
house gas emissions, the higher the co-pollutants.
In the event that the GARB did adopt a market-based approach,
the drafters of AB 32 addressed the intersection between market
mechanisms and environmental justice. The statute requires the
CARB to "[c] onsider the potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative
emission impacts from [market] .. .mechanisms, including localized
95. See generally Mark Martin, Nibez Slams Governor on Emission Law, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
17, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Martin, Niifez Slams Governor]. During negotiations over AB 32,
the legislature rejected the Governor's effort to mandate a cap and trade program, instead
leaving the decision about whether to adopt a market-based system to the primary impleWhen the Governor then mandated the development of
menting agency, the CARB. See id.
a cap and trade system through a subsequent Executive Order, some California leaders
believed he had betrayed the legislative agreement. Id. Assembly Speaker Fabian Niifiez,
one of AB 32's co-authors, stated that the "governor was reinterpreting the law based on
proposals he had suggested to lawmakers during negotiations over the legislation .. .but
that had been rejected by the Legislature." Id. The tension continues. When Governor
Schwarzenegger slated 24 out of 123 new positions at the CARB for development of a
market-based system, the legislature cut the number to two, displaying its preference for
requiring mandatory reductions rather than cap and trade. Yi, Dems, Governor Spar, supra
note 94.
96. See generally Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and EnvironmentalJustice: Los Angeles' FailedExperiment in Air Quality
Policy, 9 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'v F. 231 (1999) (describing ways in which trading programs
could cause environmental injustice).
97. Environmental justice groups fought to make sure that AB 32 did not mandate a
trading system due to explicit concerns about high-polluting plants being allowed to continue running by buying credits, and thereby emitting not only carbon dioxide but all the
"other gases that contribute to localized air pollution." See Martin, Ndfez Slams Governor,
supra note 95 (describing the concerns expressed by Jane Williams, Director of California
Communities Against Toxics).
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impacts in communities that are already adversely impacted by air pollution."9 8 In addition, the market mechanisms must be designed to
"prevent any increase in the emissions of toxic air contaminants or
criteria air pollutants."9' 9 More generally, AB 32 mandated the creation of an Environmental Justice Advisory Committee comprised of
representatives from communities most exposed to air pollution.'0 0
AB 32 demonstrates the value of state action. The law represents
Californians' democratic will to address climate change, even if only
incrementally. It also contains many innovative features, like its incorporation of environmental justice considerations, that could provide a
model for other states or the federal government. 0 1 To the extent
the State's unique provisions are not adopted at the federal level,
their preservation at the state level becomes all the more important.
C.

The Northeastern States' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

The Northeastern states have led the nation in developing the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), a cap and trade program targeting the electricity sector. RGGI could provide important
lessons to Congress and to other states or regions considering cap and
trade programs.
According to Morgan Costello, with the Environmental Protection Bureau in the New York State Office of the Attorney General, the
participating states1 0 2 contain 16 percent of the nation's population
and contribute 10 percent of the nation's greenhouse gas emissions.
Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") signed in
December 2005, they set a regional cap to take effect in 2009,103 and
must reduce their emissions to 10 percent below their initial allocation levels by 2018.104 Based on existing emissions, each state will
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
99. Id. § 38570(b) (2).
100. Id. § 38591 (a).
101. See Mark Martin, State's War on Warming, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 28, 2006, at Al.
102. The participating states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Maryland and Rhode Island are
expected to join in 2007. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS: CALIFORNIA ACTION AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE 9 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/84310.pdf.
103. See id. at 9-10; Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, supra note 36, at
1018. The cap is slightly higher than 2004 emissions, and some believe that, unless emissions increase between now and 2009, it could allow an increase rather than require a
decrease in emissions. See RAMSEUR, supra note 102, at 12-13.
104. Reg'I Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), Memorandum of Understanding at
2-3, § 2(C)-(D) (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding],
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/moufinal_12 20 05.pdf. At the conference, Ms.
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have a cap, and will be authorized to distribute or auction allowances
up to the cap level. In August 2006, the states agreed on a "model
10 5
rule" that creates a blueprint for each state's regulatory program.
The MOU gives the states a fair degree of flexibility in one of the
most controversial aspects of any cap and trade program: determining
how to allocate allowances. The MOU requires that at least 25 percent
be auctioned, with the proceeds dedicated to consumers and other
public benefits; the states can choose how to allocate the remaining
allowances. 10 6 As of the time of the conference, Ms. Costello noted
that five states had decided to auction almost all of the available allowances in their states rather than distribute them for free.' 0 7 According to Ms. Costello, the states are trying to avoid an unintended
consequence that occurred in the European emissions trading
scheme: in Europe, power generators initially received free allowances. Those who were able to reduce emissions cheaply did so,
and then sold their excess allowances, earning windfall profits. 10 8
While the trading system primarily contemplates trades among
the regulated electric utilities, the MOU permits a facility to purchase
offsets from outside the utility sector, and outside the region, to account for up to 3.3 percent of its emissions. 10 9 So long as they meet
certain threshold criteria,' ' 0 offsets could come from a wide variety of
greenhouse gas reducing activities including, for example, energy-efficiency projects, methane capture (from landfills or otherwise), and
afforestation."t The offset program also addresses one of industry's
biggest concerns about cap and trade programs: uncertain and potenCostello noted that the emission reduction goal is expected to reduce emissions to 35
percent below business as usual, the level that models show would otherwise have been
emitted by that date.
105. RGGI, Model Rule, http:///www.rggi.org/docs/model-rulecorrected1_5_07.
pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
106. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 104, at 6, § G(1).
107. Ms. Costello noted that the five states are: New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and NewJersey. See also RANISEUR, supra note 102, at 10-11 (discussing RGGI states'
auction decision).
108. See also Stephen Castle, Europe Moves to Make Big Polluters Pay for Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2007, at C8 (noting that European nations are considering auctioning
rather than freely distributing allowances, due in part to "some windfall profits... made by
power companies"). Ms. Costello noted that the decision to auction rather than distribute
allowances was also determined by particular features of the utilities' rate-setting processes.
109. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 104, at 4-6, § F(2). Offsets
obtained outside the participating states are given a lower value, thus encouraging reductions within the region. Id. at 4, § F(2) (a).
110. The offsets must be "real, surplus, verifiable, permanent, and enforceable." Id. at
4, § F(1)(a).
111. Id.at4 § F(1)(b).
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tially high allowance prices. If the price of allowances exceeds threshold amounts, facilities can meet their permit requirements through
purchasing more offsets from outside the electric utility sector and
outside the region, thereby12 increasing the supply of reduction credits
and lowering their price."
One significant concern about the regional, rather than national,
scale of the program is leakage. Participating states may fear that the
costs imposed by the new emissions controls will prompt their utilities
to produce less and shift power production to unregulated areas.
RGGI would then simply have shifted, rather than reduced, net greenhouse gas emissions.'1 3 Ms. Costello noted that the RGGI states are
14
addressing the leakage risk.'
Other states considering cap and trade programs, like California,
as well as congressional representatives considering cap and trade legislation, can learn a great deal from RGGI and its implementation.
Whether or not the Northeastern states choose to continue to operate
their independent regional program if a national program is adopted,
RGGI has served a critical function by demonstrating the viability, at
least on paper, of a greenhouse gas cap and trade system.
D.

Assessing the Role of State Initiatives

The presence of vital state actions to address climate change
raises critical questions. Since most environmental protection laws are
federal, is state action appropriate? Even if it is appropriate, is it sufficient? In this section, I will first lay out the central themes in the federalism debate. I will then elaborate on why, in light of those themes,
state climate change initiatives should be allowed to thrive, particu112. If the price for carbon dioxide allowances exceeds $7 per ton, utilities can use
offsets to account for up to five percent of their emissions, and will receive more credit for
offsets obtained outside of the region. See id. at 5, § F(3). If the price for carbon dioxide
allowances exceeds a certain threshold more frequently, facilities will have even more flexibility in meeting their requirements through offsets. Id. § 5-6 F(4).
113.

See RGGI, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INI-

(RGGI): EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS, MONITORING OPTIONS, AND POSSIBLE MITICATION MEASURES (2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/il-report-final 3_14_07.
pdf.
114. In the utility sector, California has addressed this risk through Senate Bill 1368. At
virtually the same time as it adopted the Global Warming Solutions Act setting in-state
reduction goals, the state adopted a law that requires all state utilities as well as the state's
out-of-state power sources to meet an Environmental Performance Standard for greenhouse gas emissions. That law is addressed in a companion article in this issue: Patricia
Weisselberg, Comment, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can California Curb
Greenhouse Gas Emissionsfrom Out-of-State, Coal-FiredPowerPlants Without Violating the Dormant
Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 185 (2007).
TIATIVE
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larly in the absence of federal action. I will, however, end by observing
that, notwithstanding the importance of these initiatives, they will not
be sufficient to address the climate change challenge.
1. Federalism Considerations
One set of arguments for decentralized environmental decisionmaking is based on democratic theory: states should be able to determine, for themselves, the degree of environmental protection they
desire, and should be able to determine their own balance between
environmental protection and economic development.' 15 Some argue
that decentralized decisionmaking fosters self-determination, since
citizens may be more likely to participate meaningfully at the state or
local level than at the federal level.' 16 Contrary to the claims of proponents of federal control, Professor Revesz argues that state and local governments are no more likely to be captured by special interest
groups than the federal government. 117 Moreover, if different states
take different approaches, then citizens will be provided with a range
of choices that could satisfy their individual preferences regarding the
balance between economic and environmental benefits. 1 8
Decentralized decisionmaking may also be more efficient. Since
the underlying circumstances for, and relative costs and benefits of,
regulation will vary throughout the country, uniform federal standards or approaches may be inefficient and inappropriate when applied to particular areas. 1 9 The states are likely to be better able to
determine the optimal level of regulation for unique local conditions.
115. See Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-theBottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulatzon, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1210, 1226 (1992)
(observing that, "[i]f the states have different preferences for environmental protection,
the standards that maximize social welfare will be different"); see also Carlson, supra note
41, at 312 (describing Revesz's assertion); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnesszng the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMoRy LJ. 159, 164-65 (2006) [hereinafter Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits] (describing Revesz's assertion).
116. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 610
(stating argument); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrtfice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE. LJ. 1196, 1210
(1976-77) (stating argument).
117. Richard L. Revesz, Federalismand EnvironmentalRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HAgv. L. REV. 553 (2001) [hereinafter Revesz, Public Choice Analysis]. Professor Revesz
notes that many states frequently implement environmental policies that are more stringent than federal requirements. Id. at 583-626. He also observes that those states that do
not develop more stringent approaches may simply prefer laxer environmental regulation.
Id. at 583.
118. See Stewart, supra note 116, at 1210.
119. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 317; Esty, supra note 116, at 606-07, 613-14; Stewart,
supra note 116, at 1210, 1219-20.
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Letting states develop environmental protection policies also allows them to serve as "laboratories of invention" for technological and
regulatory innovation. 120 A uniform federal approach could stifle
technical experimentation with alternative pollution control techniques. Similarly, states may develop and implement a wide range of
regulatory approaches that could provide models for other states or,
12
ultimately, the federal government. 1
The justifications for federal control are equally vigorous. Proponents of federal control argue that the states suffer from several political failings. One is that states find themselves compelled to adopt less
stringent environmental policies than they truly desire because interstate competition for industry forces them into a "race to the bottom."
States race to the bottom because, in the absence of federal legislation, each state forgoes or enacts weak regulation due to the fear that,
if it passes tough environmental regulations, existing or potential in22
dustries might locate in states with lower environmental standards.'
Federal legislation would allow states to enjoy environmental protec120. See Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note 115, at 182-83. Professor Engel quotes
Justice Brandeis's classic line: "'[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.'" Id. at 182 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
121. See Esty, supra note 116, at 606, 615; Stewart, supra note 116, at 1210 (noting that
"noncentralized decisions . . . facilitate experimentation with differing governmental
policies").
122. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 317 (stating that the race to the bottom is one of the
arguments for centralized decisionmaking); Esty, supra note 116, at 603-04; Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism: HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141,
1150, 1157 (1995) (describing instances in which states failed to regulate due to potential
economic consequences); Stewart, supra note 116, at 1211-12 (describing the dynamic in
terms of the tragedy of the commons).
Professor Revesz has criticized the theoretical foundation for the "race to the bottom"
theory, arguing that there can and should be competition among states for industrial development, a competition fostered by allowing states to vary their environmental regulation. Revesz, supra note 115. Professor Stewart has agreed with Prof. Revesz, largely
renouncing his earlier description of the dynamic. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental
Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 207-08 (1997)
[hereinafter Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good]. Other scholars have countered that competition among the states for industry is highly imperfect and that, consistent with the race to the bottom theory, the fear of losing industry will systematically
prevent states from enacting legislation that is as protective as a state might otherwise desire. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:Is There a Race and Is It
"To the Bottom"? 48 HASTINGs L.J. 271 (1997) (critiquing Revesz's theoretical model and
providing empirical support for the presence of a race to the bottom among the states);
Esty, supra note 116, at 631-37 (describing why state politicians might undercount environmental concerns and overvalue industry concerns).
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tions without the fear of losing industry. 123 Scholars argue that the
desire to avert the race to the bottom, as demonstrated by the states'
failure to control pollution, was a significant factor in the passage of
124
numerous comprehensive federal environmental laws in the 1970s.
The political arguments for state control also lose force when the
consequences of a state's actions extend beyond its boundaries. As
Professor Stewart has argued, "a state should not be entitled to invoke
the principle of local self-determination against federal controls
where that state generates significant spillovers which impair the corresponding ability of sister states to determine the environmental
quality they shall enjoy."' 125 States are likely to under-regulate, since
they might regulate only to the extent necessary to address in-state
consequences; they are unlikely to incur the costs of regulating where
the benefits accrue to those outside the state. 126 Where environmental
spillovers occur, states are at the mercy of their neighbors, over whom
they have no control. An extension of this view is thatjurisdiction over
an environmental problem should match the scale of the environmental problem:' 2 7 states can address in-state environmental problems,
but interstate environmental problems require the participation of all
impacted jurisdictions. Scholars argue that the states' failure to address the interstate environmental consequences of their economic
activities was also a major factor in the federalization of environmental
28
law. 1
Scholars have presented additional political arguments for federal control. Some argue that environmental interest groups can more
123. Professor Stewart articulates a psychological as well as an economic component:
where sacrifice is required, citizens and politicians may be more willing to act if they believe others are making a similar sacrifice. States may be more willing to accept collectivelyimposed sacrifices that will apply to all than they are to impose restrictions that apply only
to their citizens. Stewart, supra note 116, at 1217-18.
124. See Percival, supra note 122, at 1162 (noting that the Clean Water Act was adopted
to avoid the race to the bottom among industries); Revesz, supra note 115, at 1224-27
(discussing the centrality of the race to the bottom rationale in the development of the
Clean Air Act).
125. Stewart, supra note 116, at 1227.
126. Carlson, supra note 41, at 319; Stewart, supra note 116, at 1215-16, 1227; see also
Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note 115, at 164 (arguing, similarly, that where a state's
pollution extends into another state, the state will generate too much pollution because it
can externalize the pollution costs and retain the economic benefits of the polluting
activity).
127. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 187, 191-92 (describing "matching principle"
articulated in Henry N. Butler &Jonathon R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Casefor ReallocatingFederal Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1996)); Esty, supra note
116, at 593, 624.
128. See Esty, supra note 116, at 601-02; Stewart, supra note 116, at 1216.
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efficiently lobby at the national level, rather than being forced to develop and deploy limited resources in all fifty states. 129 Relatedly, state
governments might be seen as more prone to capture by powerful
state industrial forces than the federal government. 3t
Several justifications for federal regulation are grounded in efficiency: The federal government has more resources for research and
for the development of regulatory standards, and it would be inefficient to have all fifty states conduct the same research and address the
same concerns. 131 Federal regulation can also be more efficient for
industry, especially nationwide or multinational industries, which
might otherwise face different regulatory standards in different
states.' 3 2 For example, the automobile industry's support for uniform
federal emissions standards that would preempt divergent state standards was a key factor in the promulgation of the Federal Clean Air
Act. 13 3 Moreover, a uniform federal approach could promote investment in technology by providing a national market for potential
inventions. 134

This is not the place to fully evaluate the competing claims about
federalism. In some instances, the veracity of the arguments simply
depends upon the circumstances. For example, the presence or absence of a race to the bottom, or the political dynamics of affected
interest groups, are likely to depend upon the environmental problem, the nature of the affected industries, and problem-specific regulatory politics. In other instances, we simply confront competing
considerations. For example, concentrating regulatory innovation at
129. See Engel, Harnessing the Benefits, supra note 115, at 161; Stewart, supra note 116, at
1213-15. But see Revesz, Public Choice Analysis, supra note 117, at 566-68 (recognizing some
economies of scale for environmental groups operating at a national level, but suggesting
that collective action problems and insufficient resources relative to industry might outweigh any advantages gained from economies of scale).
130. See Esty, supra note 116, at 598, 649-50; Stewart, supa note 116, at 1213-15. But see
Esty, supra note 116, at 604-05 (noting uncertainty about whether the political asymmetry
between state and federal levels, and in terms of relative interest group power, exists);
Revesz, Public Choice Analysis, supra note 117 (questioning assertion that environmental
groups participate more effectively, relative to industry groups, at the federal rather than
the state level).
131. Esty, supra note 116, at 614-15; Stewart, supra note 116, at 1212.
132.

See Carlson, supra note 41, at 313-14; Esty, supra note 116, at 618-19.

133. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 116, at 602 (citing the key study of this phenomenon, E.
Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutoiy Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental
Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985)); Revesz, Public Choice Analysis, supra note 117, at 573
(relying on Elliott study).
134.

See Esty, supra note 116, at 619-20.
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the federal level is more efficient, but it also lessens the diversity of
approaches that the states might develop.
2.

The Importance of State Initiatives

With these general arguments about federalism in mind, the
question is whether it is appropriate for the states to act, or whether
the field should be left to the federal government. The question has
both legal and policy dimensions. As a legal matter, some have argued
that, notwithstanding the relatively low levels of federal action, existing state initiatives could be preempted by federal laws such as the
Clean Air Act, 1 35 especially now that the Supreme Court has held that
EPA does have the regulatory authority to address greenhouse
gases. 3 6 As discussed above, automobile interests have argued that
federal laws preempt California's auto emissions standards and, as a
policy matter, EPA must decide whether to grant the Clean Air Act
preemption waiver. States considering action must decide whether to
pursue their own measures or wait for federal action. In this section, I
argue that the federalism principles discussed above demonstrate why
state initiatives should be embraced, particularly in the face of federal
paralysis.
Fundamentally, the states are properly expressing their citizens'
desire to address the threat of climate change. Some states have
enough internal political motivation to overcome the race to the bottom and enact controls even if other states fail-and fear-to do so.
For example, coastal states, facing imminent sea level rise, are likely to
perceive an immediate need for action. 137 Political leaders in some
135. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 307-09 (discussing preemption risks); Hodas, supra
note 27, at 72-75 (discussing same); see also Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note 115, at
184-87 (discussing general risk of federal preemption of state initiatives). Professor Engel
observes that studies of the Rehnquist Court's preemption decisions have shown an unfortunate tendency to find in favor of preemption, notwithstanding the presumption against
federal preemption of state statutes. Id. at 186 n.141; see also Carlson, supra note 41, at 283
(describing the Supreme Court's tendency to find preemption).
State initiatives that affect products in interstate commerce could also potentially violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Hodas, supra note 27, at 70-72 (discussing potential application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to state climate change initiatives);
Weisselberg, supra note 114 (defending California's imposition of a greenhouse gas performance standard on imported electricity against a potential Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge).
136. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
137. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1518 n.55; Rabe, Roman & Dobelis,
supra note 29, at 24-25. California, for example, fears not only losses associated with sealevel rise, but the loss of the winter snow pack that serves as a key source of water during
the summer, when it is essential for irrigating California's multi-billion dollar agricultural
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states are also reacting to the public's growing fears about climate
change.

1 38

States may be taking more action than expected under a race to
the bottom model because of the perceived economic benefits of taking early action. 13" Governor Schwarzenegger emphasized that California's climate change initiatives will not just impose economic costs,
they could also create economic opportunities for companies investing in new technologies.14 At the conference, Devra Wang, the Director of the California Energy Program at the Natural Resources
Defense Council and one of the original architects of AB 32, stressed
the economic benefits to California of leading the way in climate
change reductions. Reduction requirements are inevitable, and if California regulates sooner rather than later, California businesses will become the exporters of cutting-edge technology, rather than, at a later
point, having to import innovations developed in other states. Some
sector and providing municipal water supplies. Coastal states' particular concerns are reflected in their participation in climate change litigation. In the public nuisance suit
against the nation's major electric utilities, six of the eight plaintiff states are coastal: Connecticut, New York, California, NewJersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In Massachusetts v. EPA,
challenging EPA's refusal to set greenhouse gas emissions standards for automobiles, ten
of the twelve plaintiff states are coastal: California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1446 n.2.
138. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1519-20; Engel, State and Local Climate
Change Initiatives, supra note 36, at 1025; Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative
Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
719, 779 (2006) (noting generally that recent state environmental activism can be attributed, in part, to "the responsiveness of state politicians to their constituents' demands for
environmental protection").
139. See generally Rabe, Romdn & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 37-41 (describing economic
potential of new technology development as a motivation for state action).
140. See Press Release, Office of the Governor of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Establishes Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Targets (June 1, 2005), http://gov.ca.gov/
index.php?/press-release/1860/ (describing Governor's view that greenhouse gas restrictions would help California companies investing in alternative technology); Press Release,
Office of the Governor of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-version/press-release/4111/ (describing Governor's view that AB 32 would be good for
business); California's Program to Reduce the Impacts of Global Warming: Questions and
Answers, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climateactionteam/factsheets/2005-06_
CATQ+A.PDF (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) (describing economic benefits to California from
increasing energy efficiency and new technology development); DeShazo & Freeman,
supra note 31, at 1518 & n.56 (describing the net economic gain California predicted as a
consequence of GWSA).
Not all observers share this optimism. At the conference, Dominic DiMare, of the
California Chamber of Commerce, stated that the Chamber argued against AB 32 because
it feared that it would deter businesses from locating in California.
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states may thus be racing to the top-racing to develop their response
to climate change-rather than racing to the bottom.
States have additional economic justifications for taking climate
change measures. Some states may hope to benefit their agricultural
4
sectors through supporting biofuels or carbon sequestration.' 1
Others may seek more reliable and secure energy supplies through
renewable portfolio standards that draw on a diverse set of local energy sources. 14 2 Moreover, energy-efficiency requirements could pro143
vide states with net economic benefits.
The global nature of climate change does not denigrate the importance of state efforts. If one focuses solely on the scale of the environmental problem and the presence of global externalities beyond
state borders, then global climate change is a global problem, requiring a global solution. 144 Only at the global level can all of the costs
and benefits of addressing climate change be collectively considered.
And most of the nations in the world are, in fact, participating in a
global solution. 4 5 As a practical matter, however, the states should
not be held hostage to the United States' unwillingness to engage
globally. The existence of interstate spillovers generally explains why
states fail to act and why a federal response is therefore necessary. The
presence of spillovers is not, generally speaking, an argument against
46
states' efforts to take global responsibility.
While acknowledging the theoretical desirability of global regulation, Professors Engel and Saleska provide several arguments in favor
of subglobal regulation. Fundamentally, they argue that a glass halffull is better than nothing. 47 From an environmental standpoint, any
short-term emission reductions achieved prior to global regulation

141. See Rabe, Romdn & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 26-27.
142. See id. at 28-32.
143. Id. at 42.
144. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 187 n.15 (citing scholars arguing for an exclusively global approach).
145. 175 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol,
available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2007)
(official web site noting number of parties that have ratified).
146. A primary concern is that smaller entities will fail to take sufficient action to address the consequences outside their borders-that they will under-regulate. See Esty, supra
note 116, at 587. If the larger entities are failing to regulate, however, then state action may
be better than nothing.
147. Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 189, 233.
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matter, since existing emissions continue to accumulate in the
atmosphere.

48

1

Professors Engel and Saleska, as well as other scholars, also justify
subglobal regulation from an institutional standpoint. State and regional efforts can catalyze subsequent action at the more optimal regulatory level, and have often done so. 1 49 Affected industries, fearful of
divergent state regulation or the uncertainty created by the risk of
state regulation, might become advocates for federal legislation that
would dull the states' interest in developing their own regulations or,
even better (from industry's perspective), might preempt state efforts. 150 Some industries are already lobbying for federal rather than
state regulation. 15 1 Companies that have emerged in response to state
initiatives, such as alternative fuel suppliers and new technology companies, as well as the states in which they are located, might also become advocates for federal regulation in order to broaden their
15 2
markets.
A critical issue in evaluating the desirability of state initiatives is
whether these pressures for federal action will, in fact, lead to federal
action. If significant federal legislation does not materialize, then state
initiatives are particularly important.
The prospects for federal legislation have improved. In addition
to the pressure for federal action created by diverse state initiatives,
the public is increasingly concerned about the potential environmen148. Cf id. at 189 (arguing that subglobal action is "better than no regulation-and
hence no benefits-at all"); Laura Kosloff & Mark Trexler, State Climate Change Initiatives:
Think Locally, Act Globally, 18 NAT. RES. & EN'VT 46, 48 (2004) (noting that state and local
climate change measures are "a good thing" because "it will be necessary to pursue many
options if we are to make significant progress").
149. See Engel, Harnessing the Benefits, supra note 115, at 170-73, 177-78; Engel &
Saleska, supra note 1, at 223; Hodas, supra note 27, at 80.
150. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 224-28. Industries might seek federal legislation both to avoid the cost and confusion of a multiplicity of standards and to "level the
playing field" of interstate competition. Id.; see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at
1504-16 (describing "defensive preemption theory," which explains why state and regional
regulation might prompt industries to seek federal legislation to preempt divergent and
uncertain subnational regulation).
151. See, e.g., David R. Baker, Oil CEO Focuses on Greenhouse Gases: Chevron's O'Reilly
Wants National Regulations, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2007, at C1 (arguing for a national approach to avoid "an expensive and inefficient patchwork of regulations"); see also DeShazo
& Freeman, supra note 31, at 1535 (discussing industry effort to seek federal legislation to
forestall state initiatives).
152. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1510-12; Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at
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tal impact of climate change. 153 With Democrats in control of Congress, climate change issues are receiving significant attention. 54 In
addition, David Conover, who discussed recent federal initiatives at
the conference, noted that some members of Congress may be willing
to support increased energy efficiency requirements to reduce the nation's dependence on oil and increase national security.
Although congressional initiatives are gaining some momentum,
there are numerous reasons why the federal government might delay
significant action and, if it acts, might not act aggressively. Legislators
from many states may be reluctant to face the short-term economic
consequences of climate change mitigation. At the conference, Mr.
Conover noted that both industry and labor figures remain concerned
about the United States' industrial competitiveness vis-a-vis China,
which, as a developing country, is not subject to the Kyoto Protocol's
1 55
emissions limits.

Moreover, states vary in their commitment to addressing climate
change. Although climate change could disrupt agricultural production in inland states, these states may perceive less immediate threats
than the coastal states.' 5 6 States' differing contributions to climate
change could also lead to divergent approaches. States that contribute
a great deal, say through auto manufacturing, coal mining, or coal
combustion, could suffer greater economic impacts from regulating
climate change than states that do not, and could delay or weaken
federal regulation. 157 For example, forty states rely on coal produc153. DeShazo and Freeman argue that federal regulation is likely as industry fears
about divergent and uncertain state regulation combine with environmentalists' recognition of the limits of state and regional initiatives, creating a "regulatory sweet spot" uniting
industry and environmentalists' support for federal action. Id. at 1533-38.
154. See Coile, supra note 3 (discussing climate change hearings on Capitol Hill).
155. Cf Dean Scott, Liebenan, WarnerStaff to Hold Meetings Seeking Inputfor Planned Capand-TradeBill, 38 EN-V'T REP. (BNA) 1427 (2007), availableat http://pubs.bna.com/ip.bna/
ENR.NSF/eh/a0b4t6d9c4 (noting that Senator Voinoich is concerned about climate
change legislation because "it is unclear what impact U.S. cuts in its greenhouse gas emissions will have on global emissions, particularly if developing nations do not address their
own rising emissions").
156. Cf David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM.J. ENArL. L. 1, 16 (2003) (observing that coastal states (as well
as Alaska) are already experiencing environmental impacts from climate change).
157. See Coile, Greenland Ice Melt, supra note 26 (stating that Senator "Dingell, a close
ally of Detroit automakers, and [Senator] Boucher, who represents a coal-producing district in southwest Virginia, have pursued a slower approach to crafting a cap-and-trade
scheme"). Senator Dingell has, however, expressed his support for long-term mandatory
reduction goals. See Zachary Coile, Dems' Plan on Energy Tilts Green, S.F. CHRON., June 29,
2007, at Al [hereinafter Coile, Dems'Plan on Energy].
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tion or have coal-based utilities.1 58 Since coal is a major source of carbon dioxide emissions, its control could significantly impact these
states. Senator Feinstein has stated that, for federal legislation to succeed, it will have to satisfy the eighty senators whose states rely on
coal.1 59 When the costs and benefits of regulation are spread so unequally around the nation, the lack of federal consensus is not
60

surprising. 1

Another impediment to federal legislation may be the power of
the interest groups opposed to significant regulation. 16 While monolithic industry opposition to climate change actions appears to be
weakening,162 some have suggested that the affected industries might
lobby powerfully against federal climate change legislation. Professor
Engel notes that "the problem of climate change lends itself to the
perversion of the public interest by special-interest industry groups
with a vested economic stake in the United States' continued reliance
upon fossil fuels."'163 Certain industries' concentrated opposition may
be difficult to counter with the more diffuse and uncertain public in64
terest in regulation. 1
Notwithstanding strong congressional rhetoric, only the Senate is
actively considering climate change proposals; 165 the House has
delayed its consideration of economy-wide legislation until at least Fall
2007.166 Federal legislation does not become law without the Presi158. SeeJohn Wildermuth, Feinstein Tactic on Her First Bill to Affect Climate: Start Small,
S.F. CHRON., Feb.24, 2007, at B1.
159. See id.
160. As one observer has stated, the Democrats "have split along regional lines over
how to solve [the climate change problem] - with many coastal lawmakers backing deep
cuts in emissions, and those from states producing automobiles, coal and oil favor[ing] a
go-slow approach." Zachary Coile, Energy Bill Draft Splits House Dems: It's Pelosi Greens Against
Industry Protectionists,S.F. CHRON.,June 8, 2007, at A7 [hereinafter Coile, Energy Bill Draft].
161. DeShazo and Freeman note the importance of interest group politics to congressional action. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1560.
162. See id. at 1534-35 (describing some industries' support for federal legislation to
avoid the threat of disparate state regulation); id. at 1552-54 (describing industry support
for a federal cap and trade program to control emissions); Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at
229-30 (describing certain industries' growing support for climate change action).
163. Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 214; see also Scott, supra note 155 (noting that
some large business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "remain wary of
the impact such legislation could have on the US economy"); Zachary Coile, Energy Bill
Reflects Shift in Power, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2007, at A3 [hereinafter Coile, Energy Bill Refiects] (noting that oil companies and electric utilities pressured Republicans to defeat a
renewable fuels requirement in a recent Senate energy bill).
164. Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 214.
165. See Coile, Greenland Ice Melt, supra note 26 (observing that the House has delayed
action on comprehensive climate change legislation until Fall 2007).
166. See id.

Summer 2007)

DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

dent's signature, and President Bush has indicated that he does not
support mandatory emissions reductions. 67 In conclusion, with the
prospects for federal action uncertain, state action remains vital.
Moreover, the states are fulfilling all the desired functions of
state-level regulation. States such as California and the Northeastern
states are establishing emission reduction goals that address the particular urgency these states perceive. The states are serving as laboratories of invention for each other and, ultimately, for federal
legislation if and when it emerges. 168 California is exploring various
regulatory options, and both California and the Northeastern states
are exploring how best to reconcile numerous competing objectives
in designing cap and trade programs. Given the relatively low level of
state regulatory action to date, the potential problem of disparate
state standards has not yet significantly materialized. Moreover, the
federal government has embraced the states' active role. 169 Rather
than perceiving state efforts as a threat to federal power, the federal
government has touted state efforts as part of the nation's overall ap70
proach to climate change.1
In light of the importance of state initiatives, courts should be
reluctant to imply federal preemption, and policymakers exercising
discretion over state initiatives, like EPA in connection with California's waiver request, should resolve that discretion in favor of the
states. More broadly, in light of all the potential impediments to a
robust federal response, states considering action should not defer on
the expectation of imminent federal legislation.
3.

The Ultimate Insufficiency of State Initiatives

As valuable as they are, state initiatives do not, and in all likelihood will not, provide a sufficient response to the threat of global
climate change. While a few states have acted aggressively, and many
states have developed initial climate change policies, most states have
not set actual reduction goals. 1 7 1 Even if all the reduction goals that
167. Id. (noting that President Bush has opposed mandatory cuts in greenhouse gas
emissions).
168. See Glicksman, supra note 138, at 781-83 (using climate change as an example of
states serving as "'laboratories' for experimentalism").
169. See Hodas, supra note 27, at 79-81.
170. See EPA, State and Local Governments-State Action, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/wycd/stateandlocalgov/state.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) ("Action at the state
level is a key component of the U.S. response to climate change.").
171. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1522 (observing that most state initiatives do not set actual reduction targets and that existing targets are relatively low); id. at
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have been set are met, they are unlikely, on their own, to actually miti172
gate the impact of global climate change.
Moreover, the federalism issues described above suggest that
many states may be reluctant to act on their own. 173 While some states

may be racing to the top to reap the economic benefits of new technologies, 174 other concerned states may race to the bottom based on

their fear of in-state economic impacts, especially where they are unlikely to reap any immediate environmental gains. 175 The states that
generate the greatest emissions, such as those with a concentration of
coal-fired power plants, could face greater costs from regulation than
corresponding benefits, at least in the short term. "Free riders" are
also inevitable in this context: since it does not matter where emis-

sions reductions occur, many states may hope to benefit from the reductions made elsewhere, without incurring any of the costs of
regulation themselves.176 While many states have taken some action
on climate change, the relatively weak nature of that action may indicate that state politicians desire to gain symbolic credit for addressing
climate change without actually imposing any significant costs on
their constituents. 177 A federal role is necessary to require reductions
in states that would not otherwise act on their own initiative.

In addition, "leakage" remains a significant concern for states
that do take action, and the fear of leakage may lead some states to
1532 (observing that most states have not addressed emissions from the most significant
emissions sources: the electricity and transportation sectors); Engel & Saleska, supra note 1,
at 215-19 (describing numerous valuable state climate change activities, such as greenhouse gas inventories, registries, and renewable portfolio standards, that are nonetheless
unlikely to lead to actual emission reductions).
172. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 220-23 (describing the relatively limited impact of the regulatory initiatives adopted as of 2005).
173. A few states have gone so far as to prohibit state efforts to address climate change.
See id. at 215 (referring to Michigan and Colorado).
174. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
175. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1518-19. In California, a business group
representative made clear that if California regulators make it "difficult to do business
here, [regulated companies will] ... just move their operations elsewhere." Yi, Dems, Governor Spar, supra note 94, at Al. A race to the bottom is not surprising in the face of such
pressures.
176. Cf Rabe, RomAn & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 7 (observing that jurisdictions may
fail to control emissions because they cannot internalize all the benefits of their actions,
since the globe as a whole benefits).
177. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 215-16. California's experience implementing AB 32 may be instructive. Although California was willing to establish relatively demanding emission reduction goals, the Governor apparently pressured CARB, the
implementing agency, to "go slow" in imposing short-term regulation. See Greg Lucas, Fired
Air Board Head Says He Tried to Keep Integrity, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 2007, at B2. The Governor also fired the agency's chair when he advocated faster action. Id.
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forego regulation. 178 Leakage occurs when emissions controls in one
state cause economic activity to move to an unregulated state, thereby
merely shifting, rather than actually reducing, emissions. 17 9 The regulating states will then have experienced the costs of control, including,
potentially, the loss of jobs, without any environmental gains.' 8 0 The
potential for leakage creates the quintessential race to the bottom, as
states hesitate to regulate for fear of losing not only industry, but any
real reductions in emissions.
Moreover, some of the anticipated mechanisms for addressing climate change, like cap and trade programs, may work more effectively
with larger rather than smaller markets,1 8 ' at least from industry's
standpoint, since larger markets provide a greater supply, create more
competition and, conceivably, lower the price of emission reduction
1
credits. 82

Notwithstanding the critical importance of emerging state initiatives, federal action is necessary.
III.
A.

Proposed Federal Legislative Initiatives
Recent Congressional Initiatives

Congress has awakened to the need for federal action. David
Conover, an attorney who previously addressed climate change at the
Department of Energy' 8 3 and who now consults for the National Commission on Energy Policy, gave a talk at the conference entitled "Managing the Unavoidable and Avoiding the Unmanageable." He
observed that interest in reducing greenhouse gases has mushroomed
178. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1532 (observing that state efforts to
control emissions might be frustrated by "leakage").
179. See RAMSEUR, supra note 102, at 3-4 (defining emissions leakage and its potential
consequences for California's climate change policy).
180. See Abate, supra note 36, at 386. California has reportedly held back from regulating its high-carbon cement industry due to leakage concerns. Carolyn Whetzel, Air Board
Finalizes List of Measuresfor Early Action to Cut Greenhouse Gases, 38 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1452
(2007), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip.bna/ENR.NSF/eh/aOb4t2e3j2. Presumably
the state feared that regulatory costs would lead cement operations to locate in other
states.
181. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 228.
182. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing both the benefits and drawbacks of large trading markets).
183. Nat'l Comm'n on Energy Policy, Our Staff, http://www.energycommission.org/
site/page.php?node=9 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). Mr. Conover was most recently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs at the Department of
Energy. Before holding that post, he was the Director of the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program. See id.
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in the new Democratic Congress and explained several recent federal
legislative proposals. Some of the initiatives build upon familiar mechanisms: increasing automobile fuel efficiency, 18 4 producing lower-carbon fuels,' 8 5 and adopting a federal renewable portfolio standard that
would require a certain percentage of energy to come from either low18 6
emission or renewable fuels.
Interest in specific greenhouse gas reduction targets has also increased. As ofJuly 11, 2007, at least five bills were under consideration
in the Senate, 18 7 offering a range of targets and approaches.1 88 Four
of the bills set economy-wide targets for direct emissions reductions.
The Bingaman-Specter bill aims for a 60 percent reduction below
2006 levels by 2050.189 Two of the bills, the McCain-Lieberman and
the Kerry-Snowe bills, aim for a somewhat greater emissions reduction
by 2050: a 60 percent reduction from 1990 (rather than 2006) levels
by 2050, to be accomplished at a somewhat faster rate. 19° The most
184. In a recent energy bill, the Senate raised fuel-economy standards for cars and
trucks. See Coile, Boost in Fuel Economy, supra note 44, at Al. According to Mr. Conover, the
House leadership is less inclined to introduce an automobile emissions efficiency bill. He
indicated that Representative Dingell would prefer to see any such measure integrated into
an overall climate change bill. See id. at Al (noting that Representative Dingell supports
delaying fuel economy legislation until Fall 2007).
185. See Steven D. Cook, Obama, Harkin Introduce Legislation to Set Carbon Standardsfor
Motor Fuels, 38 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1066 (2007), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip.bna/
ENR.NSF/eh/a0b4m7e2 (describing Obama-Harkin bill and two other fuel-standard bills
introduced in the Senate).
186. Many states have adopted internal requirements that a certain percentage of their
energy be renewable. See Rabe, Romdn & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 28-32. In contrast,
Congress is considering a federal goal. So far, the effort to adopt a federal renewable portfolio standard has not been successful. In the Senate, a proposed standard was stripped
from a recent energy bill. See Coile, Energy Bill Reflects, supra note 163.
187. Senators Warner and Lieberman are expected to introduce another bill in August
2007. Scott, supra note 155. The bill is notable because of the active participation by Senator Warner, a mainstream Republican. Id.
The House has delayed action on comprehensive climate change legislation and fuel
economy standards until the fall. Coile, Greenland Ice Melt, supra note 26. The House has
however, proposed greater support for biofuels and energy efficiency. See Coile, Dems'Plan
on Energy, supra note 157.
188. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Senate Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade
Proposals in the 110th Congress, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Economy-wide
%20bills%201 10th%20Senate%20-%2OAugust%202.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007); see generally U.S. Climate Action Network, http://www.usclimatenetwork.org (providing access to
recently proposed federal legislation).
189. Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 2(4) (2007). This bill
aims to decrease greenhouse gas emissions to 2006 levels by 2020, to 1990 levels by 2030,
and to at least 60 percent below 2006 levels by 2050, if there is a sufficient international
effort. Id.
190. The Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. § 702(b) (1),
(2007), introduced by Senators Kerry and Snowe, would achieve 1990 levels by 2020,
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aggressive bill, the Sanders-Boxer bill, aims for an 80 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2050.191 Finally, the Feinstein-Carper bill
targets the electric utility sector, with multiple interim goals and, after
92
2015, specific annual percentage reductions.
The bills contain a wide variety of additional provisions. Most of
93
the bills include funds for technological research and development. 1
Some address the potential impact of climate change regulation on
low-income communities 94 and workers or regions especially affected

achieve a 2.5 percent reduction per year between 2020 and 2029, achieve a 3.5 percent
reduction per year between 2030 and 2050, by which time the legislation estimates that the
United States would be 65 percent below 2000 levels. Id. § 702(a) (1) (B). The 2050 goal
would achieve a 60 percent reduction below 1990 levels. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, supra note 188. The Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280,
110th Cong. § 124(a) (2007), introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman, seeks to
reduce emissions to 2004 levels by 2012, to 1990 levels by 2020, to 20 percent below 1990
levels by 2030, and to 60 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate
Change, Senate Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Proposals in the 110th Congress, http://
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Economy-wide%20bills%201 10th%20Senate%20-%20
August%202.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). The legislation specifies these goals with reference to specific caps on allowances. See S. 280.
191. The Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act calls for a two percent per year
reduction from 2010 to 2020, with the goal of achieving 1990 levels in 2020. S. 309,
§ 704(b)(1). The targets thereafter seek continuing reductions below 1990 levels: 27 percent below by 2030, zd. § 704(c) (1), 53 percent below by 2040, id. § 704(c) (2), and, finally,
80 percent below by 2050, id. § 704(c) (3).
192. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, supra note 188. The Electric Utility Cap
and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007), would require electric utilities to maintain 2006 levels by 2011, to reduce to 2001 levels by 2015, and to reduce by 1 percent a year
between 2016 and 2019. Id. § 711(b)(1)-(3). Beginning in 2020, the presumptive reduction would be 1.5 percent a year, but the required reduction could be adjusted by the EPA
Administrator if necessary to achieve necessary reductions in greenhouse gases. Id.
§ 711(b) (1)(4).
Senator Feinstein views the Feinstein-Carper bill as the first step in a package of bills
that would address emissions on a sector-by-sector basis. In addition to the electricity sector
bill, she introduced legislation to raise the average fuel economy of all cars and to increase
the supply of alternative fuels. See U.S. Sen. Diane Feinstein, Cal., Issue Statements: Global
Warming: A Time to Act, http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issue
Statements.View&Issueid=5b8be264-7e9c-9af9-7e66-cefbc53eab29. She intends to introduce legislation creating a cap and trade program for industry and a national energy-efficiency program. Id.
193. See S. 317, §§ 203-204 (Feinstein-Carper bill); S. 485, §§ 201, 202, 211 (KerrySnowe bill); S. 280, §§ 251, 301, 311-13, 323, 351-55,401 (McCain-Lieberman bill); S. 309,
§ 716 (Sanders-Boxer bill); and S. 1766, § 401 (Bingaman-Specter bill).
194. See S. 1766, § 403 (Bingaman-Specter bill provision designating certain auction
proceeds for low-income and rural assistance programs); S. 485, § 702 (a) (B) (Kerry-Snowe
bill provision establishing a goal of mitigating energy cost increases to consumers, "particularly low-income consumers").
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by regulation. 195 Some provide funds for measures to adapt to inevita96

ble climate change.1

The federal legislation raises critical issues about how to meet the
proposed targets. The Sanders-Boxer bill is the only bill that explicitly
97
requires the federal government to set standards for vehicles,1
power plants, 198 energy efficiency, 19 9 and renewables.2 0 0 The other
bills do not specify how to achieve the reductions. They leave open
the possibility that the administration could develop and impose facility- or product-specific requirements, but do not mandate them.
Under all of the bills, the emission reduction goals could be met,
in part or in whole, through the development of a cap and trade system, an approach that raises all of the complex questions discussed
above in connection with existing state programs. 20 On the key issue
of how to allocate allowances to the regulated entities-whether for
free or in an auction-the bills differ, particularly in their degree of
20 2

specificity.

195. See S. 485, § 702(C) (Kerry-Snowe bill provision establishing a goal of providing
transition assistance to "employees and regions affected by a transition away from the use
of high carbon-emitting energy sources"); S. 309, § 706(b) (Sanders-Boxer bill provision
allowing allowances to be allocated to "communities, individuals and companies that have
experienced disproportionate adverse impacts as a result of... the transition to a lower
carbon-emitting economy .. ").
196. See S. 280, §§ 401-402 (McCain-Lieberman bill); S.485, § 402 (Kerry-Snowe bill);
S. 1766, § 402 (Bingaman-Specter bill).
197. S. 309, § 707.
198. Id. §§ 708-709.
199. Id. § 712.
200. Id. § 713.
201. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing issues raised by California's implementation of a cap and trade system); supra notes 106-14 and accompanying
text (discussing issues raised by RGGI).
202. As its name suggests, the Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th
Cong. § 1 (2007), also known as the Feinstein-Carper bill, is specifically designed to establish a cap and trade system for electric utilities. Id. § 711(a). It specifies the method of
allocating allowances. Eighty-five percent of the emission rights would initially be given
away, primarily to existing utilities, with 15 percent auctioned off to whoever is willing to
pay. Id. § 714(a) (2). However, the allocation method would shift increasingly toward auctions that require polluters to pay for the right to emit and, by 2036, 100 percent of the
allowances would be auctioned. Id. The Bingaman-Specter bill proposes a detailed auctioning scenario which specifies the number of allowances to be allocated and auctioned, with
increasing percentages to be distributed by auction over time. Low Carbon Economy Act of
2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 201 (a) (2007). The Kerry-Snowe and McCain-Lieberman bills
leave the allocation decision to the executive branch. See Global Warming Reduction Act of
2007, S. 485, § 703 (Kerry-Snowe bill); The Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of
2007, S. 280, § 201 (McCain-Liberman bill). The Sanders-Boxer bill permits but does not
require a cap and trade system. It sets certain criteria for an allocation system. S. 309,
§ 706.
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The plethora of existing bills demonstrate the broad range of issues that Congress will have to address in designing climate change
legislation: What level of emissions reductions and by what dates?
Should the bills address one sector at a time, or set economy-wide
goals? Should individual facilities be controlled,20 3 or should facilities
be able to trade pollution rights, or both? To what extent should the
bills finance technology development, address the economic impacts
of climate change mitigation, and address adaptation? If a cap and
trade system is adopted, to what extent should the allowances be allocated for free or auctioned? If by auction, how should the proceeds be
used? Should participants in a cap and trade system be restricted to
allowances within the system, or be allowed to purchase offsets from
unregulated sectors? More broadly, how should Congress balance industry's desire for inexpensive and predictable allowance prices without undermining the financial incentive to reduce emissions and
invest in new technology? These and other issues are likely to spark
lengthy congressional debates.
B.

Assessing the Congressional Initiatives

A full assessment of the congressional initiatives is beyond the
scope of this Article. I will briefly address two issues here: whether we
know enough to take federal action and whether the federal proposals
are environmentally sufficient. I note that a third relevant issue, the
political viability of the proposals, is addressed in Part II.D.2, where I
discussed the importance of state initiatives in light of the uncertainty
of federal legislation.
At the conference, Margaret Hoffman, who heads Chevron's Environmental Practice Group, urged caution in enacting far-reaching
federal legislation. She observed that environmentalists must grapple
with a number of their own "inconvenient truths": (1) that it is unclear whether the predictions about the impacts of climate change will
be accurate; (2) that if we focus all our efforts on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we might inadvertently create other, unexpected,
and potentially worse problems; and (3) that energy use is critical to
the economy-and that the world needs its economic as well as its

203. A related issue is whether regulation should focus on "upstream" or "downstream"
emissions: that is, on activities such as mining and oil production (upstream activities), on
activities such as industrial and consumer efficiency (downstream activities), or on both.
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environmental health.2 0 4 She thus implied that tough regulation
might be premature given the uncertainties about climate change and
how best to regulate it.
Although significant uncertainty surrounds the precise nature
and scope of climate change, there is a virtual scientific consensus that
global climate change is occurring and that it could have devastating
consequences for the globe. 20 5 There is enough certainty tojustify action. And while the economic impact of climate change must be taken
into consideration, the economic impact of failing to address climate
change may be far worse than the short-term impact of transitioning
away from a carbon economy. 20 6 Although there is some risk that
steps taken to address climate change will have unintended and undesirable consequences, any such consequences are likely to be far less
harmful than the failure to take any action at all.
Assuming that it is appropriate to take action, the next question is
whether the proposed reductions are sufficient to reduce atmospheric
levels of carbon dioxide to 450 parts per million ("ppm"), the level
many scientists state is necessary to achieve a stable and sustainable
climate.2 0 7 Both the Kerry-Snowe and Sanders-Boxer bills seek to
achieve this goal, although they differ in the level of reduction be-

lieved necessary to accomplish

it.208

The Bingaman-Specter bill, by

aiming for a 60 percent reduction below 2006 levels rather than 1990
levels, does not appear likely to achieve the necessary reductions,
since it calls for less reduction than the bills that explicitly seek to
achieve the 450 ppm goal. The Feinstein-Carper bill, by addressing
only the electric utility sector, will not suffice on its own.

204. Ms. Hoffman also stressed the importance of private sector engagement, and
noted that Chevron has invested in alternative energy and conservation. She encouraged
those active on climate change to work with, rather than demonize, the energy sector.
205. See Ohshita, supra note 16, at 2-8 (describing scientific certainty about climate
change, its human causes, and its harmful consequences).
206. See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/I/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_10_06_execsum.pdf.
207. See supra note 25 (discussing greenhouse gas concentration deemed necessary to
stabilize the climate).
208. The Kerry-Snowe bill establishes a 450 ppm goal, Global Warming Reduction Act
of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. § 702(a)(1)(A) (2007), and indicates that that goal could be
achieved by reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 60 percent below 1990 levels. See supra
note 190 and accompanying text. The Sanders-Boxer bill also establishes a 450 ppm goal,
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007, S. 309, 110th Cong. § 702(1) (B) (2007),
but indicates that that goal requires an emissions reduction of 80 percent below 1990
levels. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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Should Federal Legislation Preempt State Initiatives?

Having discussed existing state initiatives and emerging federal
initiatives, the next issue is the relationship between them. Should federal legislation preempt state initiatives? To what extent could the federal and state initiatives co-exist? To what extent should they? While
none of the federal bills proposed to date have contained a preemption provision, the issue is frequently raised and highly
209
controversial.
I argue that while federal action is desirable, it is neither necessary nor advantageous for the federal initiatives to eviscerate the
states' initiatives. Selective coordination and preemption is appropriate; wholesale replacement is not.
1.

Federalism Revisited: The Case for Overlapping Jurisdiction

Policymakers do not have to choose between federal and state
approaches; the two can complement one another. In fact, almost all
of the modern federal environmental laws contemplate a concurrent
and significant state role.2 10 Many scholars argue that a mix of federal
and state authority is appropriate,2 1 1 although determining the right
mix presents a significant challenge.
Professor Engel, who advocates "broad, overlapping authority"
shared by the federal and state governments, 212 argues that where
state action precedes federal action, at least some retention of state
and local authority is desirable to make sure that the federal action
stays vibrant.2 1 3 Professor Engel argues that overlapping jurisdiction
209. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1536 n.135 (discussing the battle over
preemption provision in proposed legislation to address the electricity sector); see also
Coile, Energy Bill Draft, supra note 160 (describing controversy over provision in House
energy bill that would prevent California (as well as EPA) from setting automobile efficiency standards); Coile, Dems' Plan on Energy, supra note 157 (stating that the House proposal to block California and others from setting vehicle emissions standards was delayed
until fall).
210. See Glicksman, supra note 138, at 737-47 (providing detailed description of the
division of federal and state responsibility in many environmental statutes).
211. See, e.g., Engel, Harnessing the Benefits, supra note 115, at 176 (describing many
scholars' advocacy of shared power, and suggesting a "dynamic federalism" in which "federal and state governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the authority of both"); Esty, supra note 116, at 648 (stating that
" [h]ybrid regulatory systems capable of addressing various problems and parts of problems
at different levels of aggregation . . . make sense"); Percival, supra note 122, at 1178-79
(stating that "the choice is not an either/or choice between federal or state authorities, but
rather a question of how both levels of government best can work together").
212. See Engel, Harnessing the Benefits, supra note 115, at 161.
213. Id. at 178.
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between federal and state initiatives provides a check on interest
group capture. 2 14 If state economic interests have captured a state government, then federal control is appropriate, whereas state action
should remain a viable alternative in the event that interest groups
21 5
capture the federal government.
Overlapping authority also makes the most sense from the standpoint of technological innovation. Federal initiatives can take advantage of greater federal resources for research and analysis, while not
supplanting the laboratories of invention that the states provide. 2 16
Ultimately, the desirability of preemption depends upon the specific nature of the environmental regulation in question. The preemption issues presented by setting environmental goals, data collection,
product standards, industrial production standards, and implementation systems (like cap and trade) all vary. Generalized approaches to
preemption risk obscuring important distinctions and would fail to
consider the particular tradeoffs presented by particular types of environmental policies.
Where the tradeoffs for and against preemption are equally balanced, Congress may also be able to develop preemption compromises. For example, where national industries desire uniform
product standards, but some states desire more stringent standards
than the federal government has adopted, Congress could adopt the
approach it took with automobile emission standards: it could adopt
what Professor Carlson terms a "modified federalism," in which the
federal government sets a national standard while one state is allowed
to diverge. 2 17 The remaining states can then choose between the federal or the divergent state standard. While not achieving a uniform
standard, industry is nonetheless confronted with only two, instead of
the potential for fifty, standards. Some innovation is encouraged,
since one state is allowed to develop an alternative standard. 21 8 And
214. Of course, one person's "capture" is another's "political accountability." It is unclear where to draw the line between a political position that is the product of "undue
influence" and a more democratically-based political position.
215. See Engel, Harnessing the Benefits, supra note 115, at 161, 178-81. Professor Engel
suggests that anti-environmental interest groups have now become dominant at the federal
level, suggesting the need for regulatory options at the state level. Id.
216. See id. at 182-83.
217. Carlson, supra note 41, at 313-18; see also Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note
115, at 186-87 (noting desirability of partial preemption, like that for California's regulation of mobile sources).
218. Professor Carlson suggests that innovation is fostered through agglomeration
economies that occur when certain geographic areas become specialized centers for technological development. Carlson, supra note 41, at 314-15.
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states are able to choose, at least to some extent, the stringency of the
regulations they would like to adopt.
2.

The Importance of Overlapping Jurisdiction in the Climate
Change Context

I provide here a few initial thoughts on how various types of federal and state initiatives could co-exist. In many instances, co-existence
is desirable. 2 19 In a few, however, preemption may be necessary.
As discussed above, some states are beginning to set emission reduction goals. There is little justification for preempting divergent
state targets. 220 As discussed above, future federal legislation may be
weaker than what some states are willing to enact. 22 ' States that are

willing to make the sacrifices necessary to address climate change by
setting emission reduction goals higher than those set by the federal
government should be allowed to do so. 2 2 2 Most of the existing envi-

ronmental laws establish a floor and allow states to set more stringent
goals. 223 There is no reason why the states should not continue to

have that freedom.
Facility- or product-specific regulatory limits present a more complex preemption question. If states are allowed to impose more stringent emissions requirements on facilities than the federal government
requires, industry faces the possibility of differing standards around
the country. It is important to distinguish between the two types of
limits that are likely to be at issue: production-process standards and
energy efficiency requirements for products.
The impact of differing production-process standards on industry
depends upon the nature of the standard. State-imposed design standards, which require facilities to adopt specific pollution controls or
219. State air agencies support federal regulation, but do not want federal action to
preempt state or local governments from taking more stringent action. See State Air Regulators Urge Action to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 38 EN'V'T REP. (BNA) 1068 (2007), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/ENR.NSF/eh/aOb4m2p3v7.
220. Cf Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good, supra note 122, at 219-21
(arguing that there is no justification for federally uniform ambient standards).
221. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
222. California, for example, seeks to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West Supp. 2007). If the Bingaman-Specter bill were
enacted, it would reduce to 2006, not 1990, levels by 2020. See supra note 189 (describing
Bingaman-Specter bill's 2050 emission reduction goal).
223. See Glicksman, supra note 138, at 743; Percival, supra note 122, at 1175 (observing
that, under the cooperative federalism model prevalent in federal environmental laws,
"[c] onsiderable state autonomy is preserved because most federal environmental standards
established under this model are minimum standards with states expressly authorized to
establish more stringent controls if they so desire").
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other technologies, could require a national or multinational company to vary design technologies by state, reducing the economies of
scale the industry might otherwise enjoy. In contrast, state-imposed
performance standards, which require facilities to achieve a certain
environmental performance but which do not require them to adopt
specific technologies, might not have the same effect. Facilities could
meet differing performance standards by such measures as reducing
hours of operation or, in the case of a cap and trade system, by
purchasing additional allowances, rather than by variations in technology. Performance standards may thus interfere with economies of
scale less than design standards. Both design and performance standards could, however, impose a competitive disadvantage on the regulated facilities in comparison with unregulated facilities in other
states.
While industry's efficiency and competitiveness concerns are
compelling, they must be weighed against the states' environmental
goals. 2" 4 Notwithstanding industry's desire for uniformity, existing

federal environmental laws generally respect state autonomy by setting minimum standards and allowing states to set more demanding
production-process standards on industry. 2 25 The case for allowing
states to adopt more stringent standards is equally strong in the climate change context. Federal standards that allow states to set more
stringent standards establish an appropriate balance: so long as they
are effective, the federal standards will achieve a high degree of uniformity by dissuading most states from setting their own standards.
State autonomy is preserved, however, by allowing states with strong
environmental goals to set higher standards.
Inconsistent product standards for items in commerce, like energy efficiency standards for appliances or automobiles, generally create a greater challenge for industry than inconsistent productionprocess standards. 2 26 Centralized manufacturers fear the prospect of
having to develop multiple production lines to meet the disparate requirements of fractured state regulation, thereby losing the econo224. See Esty, supra note 116, at 647 & n.292 (stating that states should be able to exceed federal baselines, particularly in connection with production-process standards);
Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good, supra note 122, at 206 (stating that "economies of scale ... do not necessarily justify centralized standards and regulations, especially
in the case of process regulation").
225. See Glicksman, supra note 138, at 743.
226. Cf DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 31, at 1506-08 (arguing that industry is more
likely to seek preemption of inconsistent state product standards than divergent state pollution standards).
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mies of scale associated with large-scale manufacturing. 22 7 States
might also use differing product standards as a veiled attempt to favor
in-state producers over out-of-state producers.2 2 8 On the other hand,
allowing states to impose higher standards may spur industries to
innovate.
In the past, Congress has been more likely to preempt diverse
product standards than production-process standards. The primary
examples of federal preemption of stricter state standards concern
product standards. 229 As Professor Esty has stated, "When product
standards are at issue, the benefits of having a national market with
economies of scale for producers must be weighed against the benefits
of locally tailored product requirements. '2 30 If a multiplicity of standards in commerce is a significant concern, some sort of "modified
federalism" may be possible, whereby one or two innovative states, like
California, are permitted to set an alternative standard, and other
states are given the choice of following the national standard or the
23 1
California standard.
State parameters on how to implement greenhouse gas reduction
strategies may be as important to the states as the substantive goals or
standards that they set. Some states, like California, have incorporated
important equitable principles into their state laws that may or may
not find expression in federal initiatives. California's GWSA includes
explicit references to achieving environmental justice and considering
a wide range of equitable factors in designing regulatory and market
programs. 232 If Congress preempts state climate change initiatives, it
227. See Esty, supra note 116, at 618.
228. See Rabe, Roman & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 32-33' (discussing potential for state
fuel standards to be used for protectionist purposes); cf Stewart, Environmental Quality as a
National Good, supra note 122, at 203-04 (justifying national standards for nationally marketed products); id. at 204 n.28 (indicating that, even if national standards are justified, a
uniform national standard might not be necessary).
229. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 1, at 224-26 (describing federal preemption of
state auto and energy efficiency standards); Esty, supra note 116, at 618 (discussing general
preemption of automobile standards); Percival, supra note 122, at 1176 (observing that
federal preemption of state law is "usually ... reserved for regulation of products that are
distributed nationally").
230. Esty, supra note 116, at 647 n.292.
231. See Carlson, supra note 41, at 313-18; Percival, supra note 122, at 1177-78 (suggesting hybrid approach). The federal government could also be authorized to grant waivers from federal preemption, as is the case with appliance efficiency standards. See Engel &
Saleska, supra note 1, at 225.
232. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing AB 32 provisions requiring
the state to consider various equitable considerations); supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing AB 32 provisions directly addressing environmental justice).
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will eviscerate California's well-considered decision to consider equity
and not just efficiency.
In considering implementation, cap and trade systems also present significant federalism challenges. The establishment of a federal
cap and trade system does not necessarily preclude the operation of
state-based cap and trade programs, 233 although they would require
significant coordination. In the event of a national trading system,
standardized protocols for measuring and monitoring the trades
would be necessary. However, Congress could consider delegating the
operation of a national trading system to the states. States could then
adopt either a federal baseline cap, or set a more stringent statewide
cap consistent with their own emission reduction goals. 23 4 In addition,

some states might place constraints on trades that other states do not:
for example, California might limit some trades due to environmental
justice or other concerns. Such equitable limits are not in fundamental conflict with a trading system, they merely constrain it in certain
cases. The states could also make the highly-sensitive political decision
about the extent to which they want to allocate the allowances for free
(benefiting existing emitters) or by auction (potentially generating
funds to be used for public purposes).
The greenhouse gas inventories and registries many states now
require might benefit from federal coordination. For the purpose of
national accounting and in preparation for future federal regulation,
standardized protocols for how to measure and record emissions and
emissions reductions could be preferable to having differing account-

233. Some states may, however, choose to forgo their own efforts if a robust federal
initiative is adopted. The RGGI MOU states that if a "comparable" federal cap and trade
program emerges, the participating states intend to integrate into that system. See DeShazo
& Freeman, supra note 31, at 1525 & n.83 (describing RGGI MOU provision).
234. In Europe, for example, different countries participating in the European Trading System have different reduction targets. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE
EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (EU-ETS): INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-5, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS%20White%20Paper.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) (indicating differing emissions targets for each country). Differing
targets could affect the price of credits, however. For states that have set high targets, the
ability to trade with other areas that have lower targets might lower the costs, since credits
would be more available in areas with lower targets. States that have set low targets might
be unhappy with national trading, however, since the price of credits would likely be
higher due to greater demand from the states having higher targets. These consequences
do not, however, justify prohibiting states from setting the targets they believe they need to
achieve.
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ing protocols in all states. Many states are already coordinating their
efforts, 23- 5 and federal control may ultimately be appropriate.

To the extent Congress decides not to preempt state initiatives, it
will have to be explicit. If Congress is silent on the question, the courts
may incorrectly conclude that Congress has implicitly preempted the
states' efforts. 236 To adequately protect state initiatives, Congress
should do what it has done in many existing environmental laws: it
should include explicit language authorizing more stringent and di23 7
vergent state programs.
In sum, congressional efforts to address climate change are welcome. However, the federal government is unlikely to take measures
as stringent as some states desire, and the states may have objectives
that are not reflected in federal law. To the extent possible, federal
initiatives should not preempt the vitality of existing and future state
initiatives.
IV.

Statutory Litigation Initiatives

In the absence of a significant federal regulatory role and recognizing the limits of state regulatory actions, states and non-profit
groups have turned to the courts for solutions to the challenges
presented by climate change. 238 Litigation initiatives fall into two
broad categories: (1) litigation asking the courts to interpret existing
legislation to address climate change; 2 39 and (2) litigation based on
235. SeeJanet Wilson, 31 States to Track Warming, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at 23 (describing Climate Registry created by "31 states representing more than 70 percent of the U.S.
population").
236. See generally Glicksman, supra note 138, at 787-91 (describing courts' tendency to
conclude that federal laws preempt state laws); supra note 138 (noting the Rehnquist
Court's tendency to find preemption).
237. See Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits, supra note 115, at 180 n.l11.
238. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litzgation: Implicatzons for
TransnationalRegulatory Governance, 83 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 1789, 1851 (2006) (stating that
climate change litigation has been brought "to fill perceived regulatory gaps"). For general
reviews of climate change litigation, see ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GROWING PHENOMENON (2007), avadable at www.NCS
Eonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jan/RL32764.pdf; Osofsky, supra. See generally PIDOT,
supra note 58 (describing climate change litigation);JusTIN R. PIDOT, GEORGETOWN ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y INST., GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS: A LITIGATION UPDATE (2007), avalable
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current-research/documents/GWALUpdate_3.
13.07.pdf [hereinafter PIDOT, LITIGATION UPDATE] (updating earlier description of climate
change litigation).
239. For a review of statutory cases, see MELTZ, supra note 238, at 2-10 (discussing
Clean Air Act cases); id. at 14-15 (discussing suit under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act); id. at 16-19 (discussing suits under the National Environmental Policy Act); PIDOT,
supra note 58, at 6-15 (discussing a range of cases under the Clean Air Act and the Na-
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judicially-created common law public nuisance that asks the courts 24to0
use their inherent powers to provide damages or impose controls.

This Part addresses select cases asking the courts to interpret existing
statutes. Part V of this Article addresses the public nuisance cases.
A.

Massachusetts v. EPA

The most high-profile climate change litigation to date has been
Massachusettsv. EPA, a case decided by the Supreme Court on April 2,
2007, two days after the conference. 2 4 1 Professor Lisa Heinzerling, of
the Georgetown University Law Center and the co-author of the petitioners' brief to the Supreme Court, started off the conference's panel
on litigation initiatives by emphatically supporting the plaintiffs' case.
Ryan Nelson, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the United
States Department ofJustice's Environment and Natural Resources Division, who oversees the Division's appellate section and was involved
in briefing the case, argued in defense of EPA.
I leave most of the discussion to Professor Heinzerling, who has
published a companion article on the case. 242 I will, nonetheless, pro-

vide a brief description. The plaintiffs had earlier petitioned EPA to
regulate several greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles. 243 EPA
rejected the petition because it did not believe it had the authority to
regulate greenhouse gases as "pollutants," and stated that, even if it
did have such authority, it would not exercise it for various policy reasons. 2 44 The plaintiffs then challenged EPA's denial of their petition.
In short, the Court ruled that: (1) the plaintiffs had standing to
bring the action; 245 (2) that greenhouse gases are "air pollutants"
under the Clean Air Act and EPA, therefore, does have the authority
to regulate them; 246 and (3) that, in deciding not to regulate greentional Environmental Policy Act); PIDOT, LITIGATION UPDATE, supra note 238, at 1-2 (discussing NEPA litigation and litigation under NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection
Act).
240. The two public nuisance cases discussed in this article are Californiaex rel. Lockyer
v. General Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20, 2006), challenging the largest automakers, and Connecticut v. American ElectricPower Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), challenging the nation's five largest power companies. For a discussion of private

nuisance cases, see
238, at
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

PIDOT,

supra note 58, at 15-17;

PIDOT, LITIGATION UPDATE,

supra note

3.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change and the Clean AirAct, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 111 (2007).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1440.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1452-58.
Id. at 1459-62.
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house gases from automobiles, EPA failed to exercise its rulemaking
discretion pursuant to statutorily-permissible grounds.2 4 7 The Court
248
remanded the case back to EPA.

In May 2007, President Bush responded to the case by directing
EPA to work with other relevant agencies to control automobile
greenhouse gas emissions. 2 49 He suggested that, as a starting point,
the agencies should consider his goal of reducing gasoline usage by 20
percent in the next ten years, a goal that he suggested could be met,
in part, by increasing fuel efficiency. 250 The President suggested that

the agencies complete their process by the end of 2008, just before
251
the President is scheduled to leave office.

The Court's decision is likely to have implications that go beyond
the immediate issue. If greenhouse gases are pollutants with regard to
automobile emissions, then they are also likely to be considered pollutants under provisions of the Clean Air Act that address stationary
sources, such as industry and utilities. 2 52 EPA is likely to face pressure
to use its existing authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
these sectors as well. In addition, the Court's rejection of certain bases
for not regulating, such as conflict with EPCA and the President's foreign policy objectives, are likely to have an impact on cases that have
raised similar claims, like the auto industries' suit against California's
automobile standards. 253 More broadly, the Court's expansive view of
254
standing may be applied to other climate change cases.

247.

Id. at 1462-63.

248. Id. at 1463.
249. Press Release, White House, President Bush Discusses CAFE and Alternative Fuel
Standards (May 14, 2007) [hereinafter Press Release, White House], http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html (directing EPA to work with the Secretaries of Transportation, Agriculture, and the Deputy Secretary of Energy to develop fuel
efficiency standards); see also MELTZ, supra note 238, at 10.
250. Press Release, White House, supra note 249.
251. Id.
252. See MELTZ, supra note 238, at 10.
253. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Court's
ruling that EPCA does not preempt Clean Air Act efforts to control greenhouse gases in
the Witherspoon case); supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
the Court's ruling that foreign policy implications do not justify failing to implement domestic laws in the Witherspoon case). As discussed below, the Supreme Court's ruling could
also impact the public nuisance cases by increasing the likelihood that the Clean Air Act
has displaced the federal common law of public nuisance. See infra notes 298-308 and
accompanying text.
254. See MELTZ, supra note 238, at 10.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 42

Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher

To prompt federal agencies to consider the climate change impacts of their actions, environmental groups concerned about climate
change have also turned to the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") .255 NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for all proposals for "major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. '25 6 USF's conference
focused on Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, a case in which environmental groups and a number of municipalities 257 sued the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") and the Export-Impact
Bank ("Ex-Im").258 They argue that OPIC and Ex-Im, which provide
financing for overseas development projects, including many energy
development projects, must prepare environmental reviews address259
ing the climate change impacts of the projects they help finance.
The case is significant in the climate change debate both for the extent of the emissions from the energy projects in question-up to 7.3
percent of worldwide annual emissions 26 0-and because it is one of
the first of what are likely to be many NEPA climate change lawsuits.
The conference panelists, Geoff Hand, an attorney with Shems,
Dunkiel, Kassel & Saunders, who represents the plaintiffs, and Kevin
Haroff, an attorney with Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal who is an
expert in environmental and land use law, faced a significant challenge: on the day before the conference, March 30, 2007, the court
26
decided the parties' most recent motions for summary judgment. '
The court concluded that the plaintiffs were properly attempting to
apply NEPA domestically, not extraterritorially, even though the
255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f (2000).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
257. The environmental groups include Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, Inc.
The municipalities include Boulder, Colorado, and Arcata, Oakland, and Santa Monica,
California. See Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 891 n.1 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
258. See id.
259. Id. at 892.
260. Plaintiffs argue that OPIC and Ex-Im finance projects that directly and indirectly
contribute 7.3 percent to annual worldwide emissions. Id. at 902. Defendants argue that
the projects they finance contribute a smaller percentage: OPIC-supported projects contribute about 0.24 percent, zd., and Ex-Im indicated that its contribution will "peak" in
2012 at 1.4 percent. Id. The plaintiffs argue that OPIC has underestimated its role because
it analyzed only direct contributions, such as financing power plants, not indirect contributions such as financing oil and gas development. Id.
261. See Friends of the Earth, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889. The court had denied an earlier motion for summary judgment challenging the plaintiffs' standing and several other threshold jurisdictional issues. Id. at 892-93.
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projects the federal agencies finance are located abroad. 2 62 The court
observed that the environmental effects of concern are to the domestic environment, and that the agencies' financing decisions are made
within the United States. 263 The court also rejected the defendants'
argument that the impact of global warming is too remote and specu2 64
lative to be considered under NEPA.
However, the court refused to grant summary judgment on the
issue of whether the financing decisions are "major federal actions" as
a matter of law. The court declined to find a cohesive "program" of
financing energy development activities that would require a program-wide environmental assessment. 265 The issue, then, is whether
each of the agencies' individual financing decisions constituted a "major federal action." The court concluded that this question is a contested fact-specific inquiry not resolvable through summary
judgment. 266 Since hundreds of OPIC and Ex-Im projects are at issue,
both panelists agreed that the court's ruling opens the door to a very
fact-based, extensive litigation process.
If the court decides that OPIC or Ex-Im's financing decisions are
major federal actions, then additional NEPA questions will rise to the
fore. A critical threshold question is: for a particular project, what
level of emissions could be considered "significant," particularly when
2 67
so many sources, all over the word, contribute to the problem?
262. Id. at 908-09.
263. Id. at 908.
264. Id. at 918 n.19. The court stated that "it would be difficult for the Court to conclude that Defendants have created a genuine dispute that [greenhouse gases] do not
contribute to global warming." Id.
265. Id. at 910-12.
266. See id. at 912-19. The court evaluated whether the record contained sufficient
evidence to show that each of the financed projects were federal actions by virtue of the
extent and nature of the federal involvement. While acknowledging cases that found "federal" action based upon a certain percentage or absolute amount of financing, see id. at 915
(discussing "Fish and Wildlife" case), the court appeared to adopt a more demanding standard. The court indicated that a private project would be deemed federal based on
whether a financing agency "can influence or does possess actual power to control nonfederal activity." Id. at 915-16. It remains unclear just how much influence or control a
federal agency must have before its participation will render the private action federal. At
times the court implies that plaintiffs must show that the project would not be able to
proceed without the funding. But one could argue that a federal agency has the capacity to
influence a recipient of financing if withholding the financing would make the project
more time-consuming, costly, or risky. It is not clear why federal control should be found
only where the federal financing is determinative. The court also suggests that a showing of
federal control is critical because, otherwise, the federal government could not be considered a legally relevant cause of the environmental effects. See id. at 918 n.19.
267. See PIDOT, supra note 58, at 12 (discussing issue of "significance" in "Mexican
Power Plants" case); id. at 13 (discussing significance issue in Mayo Foundationcase); PIDOT,
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NEPA's implementing regulations include cumulative impacts among
the types of effects to be considered, and thus suggest that even a
small contribution to a large problem could require consideration. 268
But where should the line be drawn? If a project's greenhouse gas
emissions and their contribution to climate change are seen as "significant," then how should they be analyzed in the EIS? 269 What kinds of
alternatives or mitigating actions will have to be considered? Litigation under NEPA, and its state equivalents, 270 can be expected on
these issues.
Overall, Mr. Haroff argued that, while the climate change impacts of some domestic projects might appropriately be analyzed
under NEPA, NEPA is not an appropriate tool for addressing the nature and consequences of energy development in the developing
world. 27 1 In contrast, Mr. Hand stressed the importance of making
federal agencies take account of the domestic environmental consequences of their financing decisions. Although NEPA does not require agencies to change their ultimate decisions, it is a critical tool
for integrating climate change considerations into federal
27 2
decisionmaking.
C.

Assessing the Role of Statutory Litigation

In evaluating litigation as a strategy for addressing climate
change, the lawsuits requesting the courts to interpret existing statutes
to require greater attention to climate change appear relatively uncontroversial. States and public interest groups are simply asking the
courts to interpret statutes in light of emerging information, a funcsupra note 238, at 1-2 (discussing "significance" issue in Mayo Foundation case).
268. The basic NEPA implementing regulations define a cumulative impact as "the
impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when
added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.7 (2006). The regulation makes clear that "cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time." Id.
269. See supra note 267 (referring to Pidot's discussion of significance in recent NEPA
cases).
270. For example, California is beginning to require state agencies to consider climate
change impacts under its NEPA-equivalent, the California Environmental Quality Act
("CEQA"). The Attorney General's Office recently brought a CEQA suit against San
Bernadino County for its failure to address climate change impacts associated with an update of its General Plan. See MELTZ, supra note 238, at 19.
271. See Kevin Haroff & Katherine Kirwan Moore, Global Climate Change and the National
EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 42 U.S.F. L. Rv. 155 (2007).
272. See Abate, supra note 36, at 399.
LITIGATION UPDATE,
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tion that the courts regularly and properly perform. While courts generally defer to reasonable agency interpretations, 27 3 judicial review of
agency actions allows the courts to act as a check on government agencies, which might otherwise become overly beholden to an administration's political goals and fail to implement statutes pursuant to
Congress's intent.2 74 The courts may not have the expertise of the
agencies whose decisions they are reviewing, but they do have the duty
to ensure that the agencies properly implement congressional intent.
V.

Common Law Litigation Initiatives

A.

The Public Nuisance Cases

Recognizing the limited reach and efficacy of existing federal and
state laws, a number of states have turned to the common law, asking
the federal courts to control the nation's most significant sources of
greenhouse gases: electric utilities and automobile manufacturers. In
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 27 5 eight states 2 76 and New
York City sued the five power companies whose 174 facilities 277 render
them "the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United
States, '278 and whose emissions allegedly "'constitute ten percent of
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from human activities.'- 279 Sub-

sequently, the state of California sued the largest automakers for their
motor vehicle emissions, 280 claiming that the defendants are responsible for "approximately nine percent of the world's carbon dioxide
273. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
274. See RonaldJ. Krotoszynski,Jr., "HistoryBelongs to the Winners": The Bazelon-Leventhal
Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 995, 1011 (2006) (describing Judge Wald's description of
the importance of judicial review in ensuring that political agencies remain true to congressional intent).
275. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
276. The government-entity plaintiffs included Connecticut, New York, California,
Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the City of New York.
Id. at 267. Three non-profit land trusts, the Open Space Institute and the Open Space
Conservancy, and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire, were also plaintiffs. Id.
277. See Press Release, Cal. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Files Lawsuit to
Reduce Global Warming Emissions from Five Largest Polluters (July 21, 2004), http://ag.
ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=709 (stating that the defendant utilities own approximately 174 discrete power plants). The defendants included the American Electric Power
Company, American Electric Power Services Corporation, the Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy, Inc., and Cinergy Corporation. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267
(listing companies).
278. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (quoting complaint's allegation that the defendant companies are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the nation).
279. Id.
280. Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 40, at 2, para. 3.
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emissions and over thirty percent of emissions from sources within the
' 28
State of California." 1
This section briefly highlights the basic substantive components
of the public nuisance claims and then explores some of the threshold
jurisdictional issues the cases present. After identifying the relevant
legal questions, the next section compares public law and common
law approaches. That analysis could help to resolve the jurisdictional
questions about the appropriate role of the courts. It also lays the
groundwork for a few preliminary thoughts on whether future federal
climate change legislation should displace or preempt the common
law.
1.

The Substantive Law of Nuisance

Under public nuisance law, a defendant is liable for an "unrea28 2
sonable interference with a right common to the general public."
Public nuisance cases are generally brought by public entities, such as
states, to protect state resources and the interests of a state's citizens.
The consequences of climate change, including impacts to beaches,
infrastructure, and collective well-being, will significantly impact the
types of public rights contemplated under public nuisance
283
doctrine.
In the classic public nuisance case, the courts determine if an action constitutes an "unreasonable" interference by focusing on the extent of the harm to the public's health and safety. 2 8 4 Unlike private
nuisance cases, which frequently balance the harm to the victims with
the usefulness of the defendant's conduct, public nuisance law focuses
more exclusively on the harm to the plaintiff, with less attention to the
desirability of the defendant's conduct. 2 5 The plaintiffs in these pub281. Id. California notes further that the defendant automakers produce cars that emit
over 20 percent of United States carbon dioxide emissions. Id. at 9, para. 40. The state also
notes that they "account for 92 percent of the light vehicle sector emissions in the United
States." Id. at 9, para. 41.
282.
283.
284.

OF TORTS § 821B (1978).
See Grossman, supra note 156, at 53-54.
See Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 448-49 (2004)

(describing the Restatement (Second) of Torts criteria for public nuisance).
285. Id. at 445. In contrast, Professor Merrill suggests that it is unclear whether, in
public nuisance cases, courts will balance the equities or focus more exclusively on the
plaintiffs' alleged harm. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 293, 328-30 (2005).
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lic nuisance cases have a reasonably compelling argument that greenhouse gas emissions significantly impact the public's well-being. 28 6
While greenhouse gas emissions arguably result in an "unreasonable" impact, the issue of whether the defendants have caused the
harm is a separate question. Professor Thomas Merrill, a conference
presenter, questioned the appropriateness of singling out these power
companies and auto manufacturers as the legal cause of climate
2 87
change when so many others contribute to the problem as well -

including the drivers of inefficient vehicles and all the industries and
residents who use the electricity generated by the power plants. Ken
Alex, a supervising Deputy Attorney General in the California Attorney General's Office who has spearheaded many of the State's climate
change cases, responded that if we conclude that the defendants cannot be held liable because "everybody's responsible," then no one will
be held responsible. In other words, if the fact that there are multiple
sources of responsibility precludes holding any individual source responsible, then none of the sources will be held responsible, and the
victims will have no recourse.
To show causation, tort law does not require that the defendant
be the sole cause of the alleged harm, so long as the defendant's conduct contributed to and was a substantial factor in the harm. 28 8 The
plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate causation will depend upon a courts'
assessment of the significance of the defendants' contributions. In
light of the electric utilities' and the automobile manufacturers' relatively significant aggregate contributions to global climate change, a
289
court could, plausibly, find causation.
286. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 54 (asserting that large greenhouse gas emissions
could be considered "unreasonable" under the public nuisance test); Pawa & Krass, supra
note 284, at 449 (asserting that the electric utility defendants' conduct meets the "unreasonableness" test); see also Ohshita, supra note 16 (describing the impacts of climate
change).
287. Professor Merrill was also concerned that the plaintiff States might have singled
out economic enterprises not located within their own jurisdictions, allowing them to enjoy all the benefits of environmental controls without having to endure their economic
costs. Mr. Alex responded that the states had not focused on the defendants' geographic
distribution, but had chosen whom to sue based solely on the magnitude of the companies'
greenhouse gas emissions, selecting the nation's five largest emitters.
288. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 25-26 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts);
Pawa & Krass, supra note 284, at 450-55 (discussing numerous instances in which courts
have found defendants liable for their contribution to a harm, including situations in
which their contributions alone would not have created the nuisance).
289. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 27 (arguing that courts could plausibly find that
major greenhouse gas emitting industries have "caused" climate change impacts).
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If defendants are found liable as contributors to climate change,
they would, under applicable tort law principles, be jointly and severally liable for the harm. 29 ° Where the plaintiffs request only injunctive
relief, as in the electric utility case, the defendant is expected to account only for its own emissions. 29 1 The prospect of joint and several
liability is more threatening to the defendants in the automobile case,
where the plaintiffs have requested damages. To avoid the potential
unfairness of joint and several liability, particularly where responsibility for the harm is so widespread, a court could exercise its equitable
discretion to allocate damages based upon the extent and nature of
each defendant's contribution.

2.

29 2

Threshold Jurisdictional Issues

The public nuisance cases also present many important threshold
jurisdictional questions: standing, 29 3 the political question doctrine,
displacement, and preemption. 2 94 In this section, I will briefly discuss
290. See id. at 31-32 (describing joint and several liability where multiple parties contribute to an indivisible harm).
291. See Pawa & Krass, supranote 284, at 455. Difficult challenges remain, however. In a
typical case with more exclusive causation, the level of allowable emissions would likely be
set at the point where the activity would no longer cause the harm complained of, or would
at least lessen its severity. Where the harm is caused by so many sources, determining the
appropriate level of reduction will indeed present a challenge to the courts. The emissions
cannot be reduced to a level that will actually eliminate the harm. A court would likely
weigh numerous equitable factors, such as technological feasibility and cost, in determining the appropriate emission standard.
292. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 32-33 (suggesting such apportionment).
293. just a few words on the subject of standing are in order: The States' standing may
be influenced by the Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, which suggested a
more lenient standard for public rather than private plaintiffs. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. at 1454-55. Because the public nuisance cases, unlike Massachusetts v. EPA, present a
substantive rather than procedural challenge, however, they may trigger a somewhat more
demanding inquiry into causation and redressability. See id. at 1453 (discussing the more
lenient standard accorded procedural challenges).
294. In the automobile case, the defendants argue that the President's foreign affairs
power preempts EPA action. They argue that having the courts decide the climate change
cases would interfere with the executive's exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy, since
the degree of existing United States regulation could be a "bargaining chip" in international negotiations. See Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a
Claim upon Which Relief May Be Granted at 11-12, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No.
06-05755 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006). As Professor Merrill has stated, such a broad reading
would unduly eviscerate judicial and state power. He notes that "[i]f the mere appearance
of an issue on the international agenda would result in automatic preemption of state
authority under the dormant foreign affairs preemption, a good deal of the police powers
of the States would become at risk." Merrill, supra note 285, at 327-28.
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the political question doctrine and elaborate slightly more on displacement and preemption.
At the conference, Professor Merrill echoed the concerns raised
by the political question doctrine: he argued that judge-made nuisance law is neither a likely nor an appropriate remedy for addressing
global climate change, and suggested that legislative mechanisms
would provide a vastly superior alternative. In Connecticut v. American
Electric Power,295 the district court dismissed the case based upon the
political question doctrine, which suggests that certain issues are so
inherently political that they should be left to the legislature rather
than resolved by judge-made common law. The court stated that the
regulation of greenhouse gases presented "non-justiciable political
questions that are consigned to the political branches, not the Judiciary." 2 9 6 The court argued that resolution of the case required an initial policy determination by the political branches, not the courts,
since "resolution of the issues presented . . . [by the case] requires

identification and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign pol,"297
icy, and national security issues ...
In response, Ken Alex agreed that a vigorous international and
national response to climate change would be ideal. Where neither
Congress nor the executive branch has initiated a significant response
to the interstate harms injuring the states, however, he argued that
the states are entitled to use the courts to seek redress for the undeniable harms caused, at least in part, by the defendants. The plaintiffs
have appealed to the Second Circuit which has not, to date, ruled on
the district court's dismissal of the case. In the next section, I will elaborate further on the significant policy issues about public versus common law that could inform the courts' ultimate resolution of the
political-question issue.
A second key issue is whether the Clean Air Act displaces the federal common law of nuisance for interstate air pollution. 298 The federal common law of nuisance is designed to address interstate
pollution. 2 99 If a federal statute offers a comprehensive approach to
the problem in question, the statute will displace the federal common
295. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
296. Id. at 274.
297. Id.
298. The term "displacement" rather than "preemption" is used to describe the relationship between federal statutes and federal common law. It is driven by separation of
powers concerns between the judiciary and the legislature, rather than by the federalism
concerns that drive preemption law.
299. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 34.
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law. 30 0 The Supreme Court has yet to provide any general pronouncement on whether the Clean Air Act has displaced the federal common
law of transboundary air pollution. 30 1 It is not clear whether courts
should evaluate the Clean Air Act's comprehensiveness by the comprehensiveness of its regulatory programs or by the comprehensiveness of its coverage of pollutants.
With regard to its regulatory programs, the Clean Air Act is not as
comprehensive as the Clean Water Act, 30 2 which has displaced the federal common law of transboundary water pollution. 3 3 Unlike the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act does not require controls on all
facilities, and, in all likelihood, does not impose requirements on at
least some of the electric utilities that could be impacted by the lawsuit. 30 4 The utility case plaintiffs thus have a credible argument that
the Clean Air Act does not displace federal common law. The Clean
Air Act does, however, require controls on all automobile emissions.30 5 The plaintiffs in the automobile case, no doubt anticipating
the defendants' displacement claim, have asked only for damages, not
for injunctive relief, presumably because damages are not available
under the Clean Air Act and the action is therefore less likely to be
displaced. If comprehensiveness of the program is the key issue, however, the comprehensiveness of the Clean Air Act's regulation of automobiles creates a significant displacement hurdle for the plaintiffs.
300. See Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I), 451 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981) [hereinafter
Milwaukee I1] (finding that the Clean Water Act has displaced the federal common law of
interstate water pollution due to its comprehensive nature); Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (same).
301. While two district courts have found that the Clean Air Act preempts federal common law, see Grossman, supra note 156, at 35-36, these cases did not address whether the
Clean Air Act would preempt cases addressing greenhouse gas emissions rather than the
criteria pollutants currently regulated by the Act. Id. at 36-37.
302.
303.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317-19.

304. The Clean Air Act imposes requirements on all major new facilities, 42 U.S.C.
7411 (2000) (new source performance standards for new sources) and on existing facilities in areas that have not attained air quality standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1) (requiring
states in nonattainment areas to impose reduction requirements on existing sources), but
not on other existing facilities. See also Grossman, supra note 156, at 35 (stating that the
Clean Air Act's permitting scheme is not as comprehensive as the Clean Water Act). But see
Merrill, supra note 285, at 316-17 (arguing that the Clean Air Act is as comprehensive as
the Clean Water Act and that, if the Supreme Court premises its displacement doctrine on
a "comprehensiveness" theory, the federal common law of transboundary air pollution
would be displaced).
305. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (requiring EPA to set emissions standards for new motor
vehicles).

§
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The analysis differs if comprehensiveness is determined by
whether the Clean Air Act addresses the pollutant in question. Now
that the Supreme Court has held that EPA does have the authority to
regulate greenhouse gases,3 0 6 the plaintiffs cannot simply assert that
greenhouse gases are not covered under the Clean Air Act, and that
the statute therefore does not displace common law efforts to control
the emissions. If EPA chooses not to regulate greenhouse gases from
stationary sources or automobiles, then the courts will face a difficult
question: Does silence, or a determination not to regulate, constitute
a decision that should preempt the common law?3 0 7 Or does it mean
that EPA has chosen not to be comprehensive, and left the field open
for common law resolution? If EPA responds to its newfound authority and does regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
sources and automobiles,3 0 8 however, that regulatory action will displace the federal common law claims the plaintiffs have asserted.
If the Clean Air Act displaces the federal common law claims,
309
then the plaintiffs could proceed on their state law nuisance claims.
At least in theory, the courts are more reluctant to find federal preemption of state common law, based upon federalism concerns, 3 10 as
well as explicit savings clauses,3 1 1 than they are to find displacement of
federal common law. If the Second Circuit overturns the district
court's initial dismissal of the utility case, that case could conceivably
survive based on state common law. Since the Federal Clean Air Act

306. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459-62 (2007).
307. Congressional or regulatory silence on an issue generally does not displace the
federal common law. See Pawa & Krass, supra note 284, at 464 n.210. An explicit decision to
forgo regulation might, however, imply that the federal government has determined that
no regulation is appropriate, a decision that might preempt a federal common law resolution. See Grossman, supra note 156, at 35 n.182.
308. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (noting that EPA is likely to regulate
automobile emissions). It remains uncertain whether EPA will regulate other sources. See
supra note 252 and accompanying text.
309. In the utility case, the plaintiffs must succeed in their appeal of the district court's
i
dismissal before they could proceed.
310. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316 (observing that federal courts are reluctant to
imply that federal statutes preempt state common law due to federalism considerations).
311. In many environmental law statutes, including the Clean Air Act, Congress has
explicitly preserved citizens' ability to bring state common law actions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(e) (2000) (Clean Air Act provision preserving common law actions). While the
Supreme Court has concluded that the comprehensive Clean Water Act displaced federal
common law, see supra note 303 and accompanying text, it has concluded, based upon an
explicit savings provision, that the Clean Water Act does not preempt state common law.
See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987).
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3 12
explicitly preempts all state-level automobile emissions standards,
that case might appear doomed. However, the plaintiffs sought to
damages rather than asking
avoid this preemption risk by requesting
31 3
the court to set automobile standards.
The common law nuisance cases raise controversial legal questions whose resolution are matters of interpretation. A review of the
strengths and weaknesses of the common law in relation to public law
could help the courts determine how to exercise that interpretive
discretion.

B.

Assessing the Role of the Common Law

As Professor Merrill stated at the beginning of his conference
presentation, the common law litigation presents profound questions
of institutional choice and design. I will review the advantages and
disadvantages of the common law and public law according to several
parameters for evaluating the institutional choice. These parameters
include: (1) democratic principles; (2) effectiveness as a tool for addressing environmental problems (considering such factors as comprehensiveness, consistency, flexibility, and advance notice); (3)
institutional competence; and (4) the availability of a remedy for pollution victims. In light of the advantages of both institutions, I will
briefly address the arguments for and against allowing overlapping jurisdiction. I will then apply these insights to the climate change nuisance lawsuits.
1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Common Law and
Public Law
a.

Democratic Principles

Democratic principles present a key parameter by which to evaluate the choice between the common law and public law. They are also
critical to the political question doctrine, discussed above. 3 14 Congress passes statutes through a democratic process; judges are not accountable. While not democratic, agencies develop regulations
through a transparent process that generally requires full public infor312. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (stating that "[n]o State or any political subdivision
thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines").
313. Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 40, at 3, para. 6.
314. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
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mation and participation, 31 5 unlike common law cases, which involve
only the parties, intervenors, and those amici allowed by the courts.
More accountable institutions such as legislatures and agencies may
also be better suited to handle the delicate political balance between
environmental and economic concerns that environmental issues inevitably raise.3 16
The judiciary's lack of political accountability can also be seen as
one of its virtues, however. The courts are insulated from the lobbying
endemic in the legislative and regulatory process.3 17 As Professor McGarity has stated, "[t] ort law corrects for a regulatory system that is too
easily controlled by the very interests it is supposed to be controlling. '3 1 8 Public choice theorists, who posit that legislative outcomes

are a function of relative interest group influence and power, argue
that the political process is controlled by interest groups at the expense of everyday citizens.3 19 Some commentators have stated that, in
contrast, the "[c] ommon law evolved to protect rights, not to protect
interest groups. '32 0 While the courts may not be comfortable addressing the political and economic issues they confront, they avoid some
of the public choice perils endemic to the political process. Furthermore, the legislative branch has the power to alter the common law if
it so chooses, providing an ultimate democratic check on the judici3 21
ary's use of its common law powers.
315. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (Administrative Procedures Act provision describing
agency rulemaking procedures).
316. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text (discussing district court's dismissal
of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), under the
political question doctrine).
317. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State,
IOWA L. REV. 545, 573 (2007); Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the

American Codification Debate, in THE

COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE
STATUTORY BAsis FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 143 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.

Morriss eds., 2000) (noting that common law resolution of environmental issues avoids
grand political bargains and interest group lobbying); id. at 154 (observing that the "common law is much superior to statutory law in controlling the role of interest groups").
318. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulation and Litigation: Complementary Tools for Environmental Protection, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 371, 373 (2005). He also notes that "local judges
and juries are less likely than congresspersons and regulatory agency heads to be swayed by
large campaign contributions and behind-the-scenes lobbying." Id. at 382. Professor McGarity argues that industry groups are often more powerful players in the regulatory process than environmental groups, skewing regulatory outcomes. Id. at 381, 389.
319. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 954-56 (1999).
320.

See id. at 956, 960.

321.

See

GuIDO CALABRESI,

A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

4-5 (1982).
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Defenders of the common law also assert that the common law
can be more responsive to changes in society that require new approaches. 3 22 While legislatures are locked in political paralysis, the
courts must respond to the cases before them. Although the principle
of stare decisis is a guiding force, the courts nonetheless have the
power to evolve incrementally. 32 3 Moreover, the doctrines are often
flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances without changing the doctrines themselves. To take nuisance law, for example, the
concept of what types of actions are "unreasonable" is capable of
evolving as society evolves, without requiring a fundamental doctrinal
shift, and without requiring all of the necessary political stars to align.
Even if common law actions are not ideal, the ability of litigants
to bring them might prompt an otherwise paralyzed legislature or administrative agency into action. 324 Professor Kristen Engel has argued
that common law actions, particularly against out-of-state defendants,
could trigger political pressure for a federal legislative response that
would displace the common law actions. 325 Industries that might otherwise oppose regulation might be more willing to support a legislative program if the alternative is piecemeal and unpredictable
32 6
common law actions.
b.

Effectiveness as an Environmental Protection Tool

Another key factor is the relative effectiveness of common law
and public law as a matter of environmental policy. One parameter is
the comprehensiveness of the approach. The common law, operating
on a case-by-case basis, is generally not comprehensive..3 2 7 Under the
common law, individual plaintiffs with sufficient resources and motivation bring cases against individual companies. As a result, one company may be sued, while another, operating in a similar fashion,
perhaps even in a similar setting, might not. Many instances of envi322. See id. at 4; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 319, at 959, 963.
323. See CALABRESI, supra note 321, at 4; Morriss, supra note 317, at 153.
324. See generally Abate, supranote 36, at 392, 399 (stating that climate change litigation
might prompt a federal regulatory response).
325. Kirsten H. Engel, HarmonizingRegulatory and LitigationApproaches to Climate Change
Mitigation: IncorporatingTradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1563, 1572-77 (2007). In order to counteract the competitive disadvantage that a
state's regulation could impose on in-state businesses, states are likely to sue out-of-state
defendants over whom they are unable to assert direct regulatory control. Id. at 1573-75.
The lawsuits could prompt the out-of-state defendants, who are unable to assert political
control over the suing states, to advocate for a federal regulatory response. Id. at 1575.
326. Id. at 8-9; see also Abate, supra note 36, at 392.
327. See Klass, supra note 317, at 583.
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ronmental harm might not be addressed because the victims lack the
resources to bring suit, or because of the "free rider" problem: each
resident's hope that someone else will bring suit. Public law approaches are likely to be much more comprehensive, addressing all
similarly-situated actors.
Moreover, a common law legal system might impose inconsistent
results. Two similar facilities might be subject to common law actions
but, due to the lack of precise standards and the notorious subjectivity
of nuisance law, the outcomes might be inconsistent.3 28 For example,
one might be held liable and the other not. Even if both are found
liable, the level of damages and availability of injunctive relief could
differ. Public law is likely to establish objective, consistent standards
that apply evenly to all facilities.
However, with consistency comes the absence of flexibility. Statutes that impose consistent standards on all facilities do not have the
flexibility to vary in response to differing circumstances. For example,
the Clean Water Act imposes the same threshold technology-based
standard on all facilities within a category, regardless of water quality. 329 The common law, in contrast, sets standards in response to the
particular situation presented, considering both environmental needs
and the polluting entities' circumstances.
Another factor to consider is advance notice to the regulated
community. At least in cases of first impression, the common law operates retroactively, imposing liability for past behavior rather than dictating standards for future behavior. 330 The availability of that relief is
a virtue of the common law from the perspective of pollution victims,
but it is undesirable to the regulated community because they do not
know in advance what conduct might be found actionable. In contrast, public law provides advance notice of applicable legal
requirements.
The advantages of public law in terms of comprehensiveness, consistency, and advance notice all contributed to the codification of en-

328. Id. (noting the common law's lack of uniformity).
329. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000) (establishing technology-based standards for
certain categories of existing sources).
330. See Klass, supra note 317, at 569; McGarity, supra note 318, at 401 (noting the
retroactive application of the common law). In theory, over time, the common law could
develop standards that would provide a prospective warning to others in the field. However, to the extent that nuisance suits are inconsistent, they provide unclear signals to
potential future defendants.
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vironmental law. 33 1 Industry supported codification because
piecemeal "regulation" through common law cases and inconsistent
treatment created an uneven playing field for businesses, disrupting
competitive markets. 33 2 Moreover, industry preferred advance notice
of predictable standards to the retroactive application of unpredictable standards. Environmental groups also supported federal statutes
because they preferred a more comprehensive approach that did not
rely on the piecemeal efforts of individual plaintiffs or the relative
power of defendants.
c.

Institutional Competence

The next factor to consider is institutional competence. Legislation often delegates regulatory authority to administrative agencies
who, unlike judges, are scientific and policy experts. Common law
judges do not have the same expertise. Unlike judges, who rely upon
the parties for information, agencies also have the resources to de333
velop their own knowledge base.
The institutional competence argument for public law should
not, however, be overstated. While judges do not have the scientific
expertise of agency officials, they do have the benefit of sworn experts.
At least in comparison with the sometimes anecdotal information
available to legislators, their information may also be relatively de334
pendable and thorough.
d.

Remedy for Victims of Pollution

Finally, the common law, unlike statutes, provides a remedy for
pollution victims. 33 5 Statutes set standards and then authorize the
state to impose penalties for their violation, but the penalties go to the
state, not to pollution victims. Under the common law, victims may be
331. Beginning in 1970, numerous federal environmental statutes were promulgated.
See Percival, supra note 122, at 1160-61. While partly a response to the failure of state
regulatory measures, the effort also represented an implicit rejection of the common law as
an environmental policy tool. See Meiners & Yandle, supra note 319, at 956-58.
332. See McGarity, supra note 318, at 380-81 (arguing that this is industry's stated rationale for having federal legislation preempt state common law actions, but expressing skepticism that it fully explains their desire for preemption). On some accounts, the
development of federal statutory environmental law was supported by industries who
sought uniformity and feared the potential of more rigorous state common law. See Meiners & Yandle, supra note 319, at 956-57.
333. See Klass, supra note 317, at 569.
334. See id. at 582.
335. See id. at 583; McGarity, supra note 318, at 391-92.
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entitled to compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive
33 6
relief tailored to the circumstances.
e.

Overlapping Jurisdiction

Public law and common law are not mutually exclusive. In light of
the respective virtues of each, they often coexist, at least with respect
to state common law. 3 37 Many environmental statutes explicitly in-

clude "savings" clauses that preserve the ability of private parties to
pursue traditional common law remedies. 338 One can view statutes
and common law as complementary. Statutes provide a comprehensive, preventative, regulatory regime, while the common law continues
to provide pollution victims with a remedy for their injuries. They are
also complementary in the sense that common law litigation can make
use of the scientific and factual information developed by environmental agencies, providing the common law process with the benefits
of the modern administrative state.3 39 In addition, the general standards developed under regulatory programs may not be flexible
enough to address the unique environmental or economic circumstances associated with a given facility's pollution. A regulatory standard based on available technology may fail to protect a community in
particularly close proximity to a facility, for example. A nuisance remedy could provide that community with the ability to seek additional
protection if the regulatory controls do not provide adequate
340
safeguards.
336. Some commentators have noted that the common law has the capacity to go farther than statutes, including shutting down a facility-an uncommon result under a statute. Meiners & Yandle, supra note 319, at 956.
337. See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court doctrine that makes it more likely for federal common law to be preempted by federal statutes
than state common law).
338. See Klass, supra note 317, at 570 & n.143 (noting savings provisions in Clean Water
Act, Clean Air Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act); id. at 584-88 (observing numerous instances in which state common law
actions were available against regulated defendants); Meiners & Yandle, supra note 319, at
952, 953 (discussing savings clauses).
339. See Klass, supra note 317, at 591-95. Professor Klass notes thatJustice Cardozo, an
early thinker about the relationship of statutory and common law, believed that 'judges
had an obligation to integrate administrative expertise and social development into common law." Id. at 553. Professors Meiners and Yandle go one step further, arguing that
federal agencies should forgo much of their regulatory action, and instead gather and
disseminate information to enable more effective use of the common law. See Meiners &
Yandle, supra note 319, at 961-62.
340. InternationalPaper Company v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), the Supreme Court
case that held that state common law is not preempted by the Federal Clean Water Act,
presents these types of facts. The pollution controls imposed under the Clean Water Act
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Overlapping jurisdiction could, however, allow certain problematic features of the common law to persist. For example, industry
might face greater uncertainty if it remains vulnerable to common law
actions. To the extent that a facility is subject to liability under the
common law, it will also face a competitive disadvantage relative to
those facilities that are subject only to statutory requirements. Nonetheless, the presence of comprehensive regulation may, in many instances, placate potential plaintiffs except under the most egregious
circumstances, and may, therefore, minimize the degree of uncertainty and potential inconsistency facing industry. Moreover, the common law's ability to respond to unique circumstances is intrinsically
valuable; predictability and consistency are not the only values served
by the law.
2.
a.

Application to Climate Change
Common Law in the Absence of Federal Regulation

In the absence of comprehensive federal and state climate
change legislation, federal and state common law actions are essential
tools for allowing the victims of climate change (all of us) to begin to
address its consequences. If courts use doctrines like the political
question doctrine, displacement, and preemption to dismiss the public nuisance cases, they will eliminate the only means currently available to address the nation's most significant greenhouse gas emissions.
Notwithstanding RGGI and a few other states' modest efforts,
most carbon dioxide emissions from electric utilities are unregulated.
California is the only state attempting to address automobile emissions, and it remains unclear whether EPA will waive the customary
preemption. Even if the California regulations are allowed to go forward, they will be applied only in California and in the limited number of states that have chosen to adopt them. Until the federal
government adopts a more comprehensive regulatory program, the
common law is the only means for addressing the significant harms
caused by these industries.
In an ideal world, a democratic legislative process to control climate change would be preferable to the decisions of individual
judges. But when the legislative process has failed to produce results,
the political argument for allowing common law actions, that legislawere insufficient to protect residents across the lake from a paper mill, and the Court
allowed the citizens to bring an action under the state common law of nuisance-so long
as they applied the common law of the state in which the discharging facility was located.
See id.
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tive processes may be paralyzed or captured, provides a compelling
to hear the common law actions
justification for allowing the courts
341
that have been brought to date.

As discussed in Part I, the federal government has failed to take
sufficient action administratively. 342 While Congress has proposed significant legislation, it has not yet been adopted. The existing common
law can fill the vacuum. Tort law already prohibits "unreasonable interference" with "public rights," and the law of public nuisance is flexible enough to respond to the new types of injuries that environmental
scientists have identified. Moreover, if the common law actions against
the automobile manufacturers and electric utilities are allowed to proceed, that may jolt Congress out of its paralysis and induce it to respond with a statutory scheme designed to replace the judicial
resolution. The common law of nuisance may therefore be a particularly necessary vehicle for addressing the shortcomings of the political
process.
In terms of the common law's effectiveness in creating environmental policy, the automobile manufacturer climate change nuisance
case avoids the lack of comprehensiveness and the potential for inconsistency inherent in the common law. Rather than singling out a few
random actors, the case against the automobile manufacturers captures almost all the major players in the American automobile market. 343 The court's ruling will not result in piecemeal and inconsistent
standards among the players. The case against the power companies is
not as comprehensive, but it does target the nation's five largest emitters, who allegedly contribute 25 percent of the nation's electric utility
emissions. 344 In the future, if plaintiffs attempted to sue in a more
piecemeal fashion, they could have difficulty showing that the defendants contribute substantially to the alleged harm. 345 Thus, the causation hurdle could limit climate change public nuisance cases to
relatively large and comprehensive actions.
341. See Rabe, Romdn & Dobelis, supra note 29, at 45 (noting that litigation "is a flexible tool for overcoming regulatory inertia at the federal level.... [W] hen there is stagnation in politics, the judicial system provides a regulatory outlet").
342. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (discussing my assessment of the
federal administrative actions taken to date).
343. See supra note 281 (noting that the automakers who were sued represent 92 percent of the domestic automobile market).
344. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
345. Given the multitude of sources and the cumulative nature of the harm, it is, however, possible that a court would recognize a relatively small contribution as "substantial" in
light of the collective impact of many small contributions. In that case, piecemeal common
law actions could become more likely.
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Institutional competence is a considerable obstacle in the power
plant case, since judges are likely to be uncomfortable setting a standard for the electric utility industry. However,judges in nuisance cases
have been expected to set standards for facilities since the onset of
nuisance law. 346 Industry and scientific experts are now widely available to assist judges. The process might not be ideal, but it does not
justify eliminating the only legal redress available.3 47 The expertise
challenge in the automobile case appears somewhat less daunting,
since the plaintiffs have asked the court for damages rather than an
injunction. While evaluating the damage claims is challenging, it does
not appear beyond the competence ofjudges who must regularly evaluate complex claims for damages.
The final virtue of the common law, that it provides a remedy to
victims, is a factor in the automobile case but not the utility case. In
the utility case, the plaintiffs are essentially asking the courts to set a
regulatory standard, and are not seeking a remedy for themselves. In
contrast, in the automobile case, the state is seeking damages for present and future costs arising from climate change, a remedy that
would not be available under a regulatory approach.
In sum, the common law provides a legal remedy for a serious
injury that the political branches have failed to provide. Common law
actions could also create political pressure for needed congressional
action. Moreover, the climate change public nuisance cases brought
to date do not pose as great a risk of piecemeal and inconsistent standards as common law cases sometimes pose. The courts' relative institutional competence, from both a technical and a political
perspective, is a concern, and one that suggests that a legislative approach would ultimately be preferable. Nonetheless, in the absence of
a legislative response, the common law's "second best" is better than
nothing.
b.

Should Federal Legislation Preempt or Displace the Common
Law?

If and when the federal government more actively regulates
greenhouse gases from power plants or automobiles under existing
346. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (issuing injunction requiring copper smelter to reduce emissions); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650
(1916) (issuing revised injunction).
347. It is also possible that the lawsuit will prompt the parties to settle, which will allow
them to use their own knowledge of the affected industries to craft a mutually acceptable
resolution.
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law, or Congress passes relevant legislation, then the relationship between the public law and common law becomes more complex. In
light of Supreme Court precedent, comprehensive federal regulation
of greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities and automobiles
would displace federal common law. 348 I will not, therefore, engage in

a fruitless inquiry into the wisdom of that displacement. More interesting is the status of state common law.
Should federal legislation include express savings clauses for state
common law actions, like many existing environmental laws? 349 Or

should they explicitly preempt common law actions? If new federal
legislation is silent, should the courts be quick or reluctant to find that
Congress implicitly preempted state common law? I offer a few tentative thoughts on this close question. I will first note why, in theory,
effective federal regulation should preempt the common law. I will
then indicate why, prudentially, it would be wiser to retain the common law as a check on potential political distortions.
Theoretically, if Congress enacts effective regulation, then much
of the need for the common law dissipates. Arguably, the states and
environmental advocates have brought suit because of the absence of
3 50
regulation, not because the common law is their remedy of choice.
So long as the political branches act, they are preferable to the courts.
The political process provides a forum for weighing all of the relevant
interests, and administrative agencies can implement the resulting legislation with their superior expertise.
Moreover, a comprehensive consistent approach is preferable to
the potentially piecemeal results that could occur in future common
law suits. While the existing suits do not present a significant concern
in this regard, and future plaintiffs might not succeed in more fragmented litigation due to causation obstacles, the common law does
have the potential to be more piecemeal than legislation, creating potential inconsistency and uncertainty for industry. Nor is such potential inconsistency a necessary consequence of desirable flexibility.
While the common law's flexibility allows it to address unique local
circumstances that uniform federal laws cannot, greenhouse gas emissions do not cause adverse local effects that would require locationspecific regulation. The common law's superior flexibility is less neces348. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing Milwaukee I and statutory
displacement of federal common law).
349. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing savings clauses).
350. See supra Part.V.A.2, at p. 95 (noting California litigator's acknowledgement that
national and international regulation would be preferable to the common law actions).
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sary in the climate change context than in many other environmental
contexts.
The common law does provide a remedy for victims and forces
those engaging in harmful conduct to internalize the negative consequences of their actions. However, the common law's provision of a
remedy to pollution victims does not provide quite as compelling a
justification for allowing common law actions in the climate change
context as it does in many other environmental contexts. First, the
primary goal of the current litigants is, arguably, to find an avenue for
addressing climate change, not to obtain compensation. 351 Second,
climate change cases differ somewhat from other nuisance cases. The
fact that all members of society contribute to greenhouse gas emissions should not relieve the largest emitters of their obligation to control their large-scale emissions prospectively. However, our collective
responsibility does make holding certain emitters or producers financially responsible for past harm less compelling.
As a practical matter, however, common law actions are needed
as a check on the political process. In light of the potential political
obstacles to action, it is possible that the political process will generate
weak and relatively ineffective legislation. If so, the common law
would provide the victims of climate change with an important antidote to a flawed political process.
The adverse consequences of retaining the common law option
should be relatively low. If federal legislation is effective, then plaintiffs contemplating common law actions will recognize the difficulty of
proving that defendants who are complying with an effective federal
law are causing "unreasonable" harm. Common law actions are thus
unlikely if effective federal legislation is adopted. 35 2 If federal administrative or legislative action is weak or largely symbolic, however, then
plaintiffs might have a better chance of proving the unreasonableness
of potential defendants' conduct notwithstanding their compliance
351. Although the plaintiffs in the automobile case seek damages, that choice of remedy was likely dictated by the preemption concerns that seeking an emissions standard
would raise. See supra note 45 (discussing the Clean Air Act's general preemption of nonfederal automobile emission standards). As noted above, a California litigator indicated
that regulation is preferable to common law actions, notwithstanding the lawsuit's request
for damages that would not be available under a regulatory approach. See supra Part.V.A.2,
at p. 95.
352. Cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, On Being Regulated in Foreszght versus Being Judged in Hindsight, in THE COMMON LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 242, 254 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P.
Morriss eds., 2000) (suggesting that facilities are less likely to be found negligent in a common law action if they have complied with statutory requirements).
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with the weak federal law.3553 In that instance, the common law would
be performing an important function by providing an alternative legal
mechanism to force industries to internalize their costs and to protect
the victims of climate change.
So long as public law is not forthcoming, the common law remains a critical legal tool for addressing one of the most serious harms
the globe has ever faced. Even if comprehensive legislation is ultimately implemented, the common law could provide an important
check on the political process.
VI.

Conclusion

USF's symposium began with a sense of trepidation, as we collectively considered the potential catastrophe ahead. The conference ended with a sense of hope. State and local governments have taken the
lead through innovative programs that may serve as models for other
states or the federal government. Congress is finally beginning to explore goals and mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gases. Litigation is pushing agencies to consider the full scope of the statutes they
implement and asking the courts to apply their historic powers to address the planet's most pressing problems.
The plethora of federal, state, and litigation initiatives raise critical institutional questions about federalism and the relationship between democracy and the courts. Each of our legal institutions,
including the federal government, the states, and the courts, has a
role to play. Letting them each play their respective roles increases the
likelihood that our legal institutions will respond effectively to the fundamental challenge posed by global climate change.

353. But see id. (arguing that compliance with standards may reduce common law liability, even if the standards are too low).
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